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ESSAY

"DO JUSTICE!":
VARIATIONS OF A THRICE-TOLD TALE
Michael Herz*

I remember once I was with [Justice Holmes]; it was a
Saturday when the Court was to confer. It was before we had
a motor car, and we jogged along in an old coupg. When we
got down to the Capitol,I wanted to provoke a response, so as
he walked off, I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!"
He turned quite sharply and he said: "Come here. Come here."
I answered: "Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."
Judge Learned Hand'
There is a story that two of the greatestfigures in our law,
Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, had lunch together
and afterward, as Holmes began to drive off in his carriage,
Hand, in a sudden onset of enthusiasm, ran after him, crying,
"Do justice, sir, do justice." Holmes stopped the carriage and
reproved Hand: "That is not my job. It is my job to apply the
law."
Judge Robert Bork2
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thanks to Larry Kramer,
John McGinnis, Richard Weisberg, Chuck Yablon, and the participants in a faculty
workshop at the Emory University School of Law for comments on earlier drafts, to
Ray Henson, Tom Grey, Gerald Gunther, and Steve Loffredo for helpful correspondence, to Arthur Jacobson for talking through this material with me, and to Michael
Jaffe (Cardozo '94) for helping track down a number of the versions of the "Do
justice!" story discussed herein.

I Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of Liberty 302,306-07 (Irving

Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
2 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 6 (1990).
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Let me conclude with an old story about judges, law and
justice. Learned Hand was visiting Washington and went to
lunch with Justice Holmes. They walked back to the Capitol.
The Courtwas still sitting there in the Old Senate Chamber. As
they parted, Hand called, "Sir, do justice."
The old man turned on him fiercely, eyebrows bristling:
"Justice? What's that? That's none of my business. Law is my
business."
ProfessorAbram Chayes3

A

LTHOUGH recent debates would suggest that narrative
scholarship is brand new,4 lawyers, judges, and law professors, like all humankind, have always offered stories for illustration or support or to make a point in an indirect, and often
more effective, way. Learned Hand's story about telling Justice
Holmes to "do justice" is one widely-used example, offered by
many writers in addition to Judge Bork and Professor Chayes.
Its popularity is easy to understand. The story has a substantive
message, pithily expressed, on a basic jurisprudential issue; it
involves two members of the pantheon; and it crams a lot of
human interest and historical flavor into a few lines.
The exchange between the two judges is part of an age-old
struggle to define the relation of law and justice and to deter-

3 Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1026, 1041 (1988) (footnote omitted).
4 On the controversy over narrative scholarship, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the
Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67
S. Cal. L. Rev. 255 (1994); Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law,
23 Rutgers LJ. 79 (1991) (book review); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in
School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 665 (1993); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1994); Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 647 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev.
807 (1993); Elizabeth J. Samuels, Stories Out of School: Teaching the Case of Brown
v. Voss, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 1445, 1446-51 (1995). See generally Symposium, Legal
Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989) (addressing questions of legal narrative and
its "counterhegemonic" power).
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mine to which the judge owes loyalty.5 Some distinction
between law and justice, certainly as a descriptive matter and
often as a normative one, is generally accepted. Law schools are
famous for insisting on such a separation, 6 and lawyers and
nonlawyers alike easily accept the concept of an "unjust law" or
a judicial decision that is "unfair" (or unjust) but "correct as a

matter of law." The distinction is perhaps more often celebrated

7
within the legal profession and more often lamented outside it.

Holmes, of course, is particularly associated with what
Anthony D'Amato and Arthur Jacobson label the "'Separation
Thesis'-the thesis that law is entirely separate and distinct from
any value-system such as justice or morality."'8 It was Holmes
who famously proclaimed, "I hate justice." This sentiment is

usually cited to a letter from Holmes to John Wu: "I have said
to my brethren many times that I hate justice, which means that
I know if a man begins to talk about that, for one reason or
another he is shirking thinking in legal terms." 9 This strenuous
5

In a tribute to J. Skelly Wright, Justice William J. Brennan distinguishes the judge

"who sees his role as guided by the principle that 'justice or righteousness is the

source, the substance and the ultimate end of the law,' from the judge for whom the
guiding principle is that 'courts do not sit to administer justice, but to administer the
law."' William J. Brennan, Jr., In Memoriam: J. Skelly Wright, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 361,

361 (1988). Justice Brennan notes that Holmes and Hand "have been associated with
the latter view." Id. Similarly, G. Edward White distinguishes Earl Warren's natural
law approach to judging from the position that "the proper decisionmaking calculus
for an appellate judge should not include unarticulated notions of fairness and justice,"
of which Holmes' rejoinder to Hand is an example. G. Edward White, Earl Warren
as Jurist, 67 Va. L. Rev. 461, 540 (1981).
6 For a discussion and critique of this tendency, see Symposium, The Justice Mission
of American Law Schools, 40 Clev. St. L. Rev. 277 (1992). One important step toward
exploring and to some extent erasing the distinction in legal education is Anthony
D'Amato & Arthur J. Jacobson, Justice and the Legal System: A Coursebook (1992).
7 Thoreau aired a familiar complaint in his essay Civil Disobedience: "Law never
made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the welldisposed are daily made the agents of injustice." Henry David Thoreau, Civil
Disobedience, in The Portable Thoreau 109, 111 (Carl Bode ed., rev. ed. 1964).
8 D'Amato & Jacobson, supra note 6, at 234.
9 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (July 1, 1929), in Justice
Holmes to Doctor Wu: An Intimate Correspondence, 1921-1932, at 53 (n.d.), and in
The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes 435 (Max Lerner ed., 1943). Similarly, Holmes
is often quoted as having said that the Supreme Court is not a court of justice but a
court of law. See, e.g., Eugene W. Hickok & Gary L. McDowell, Justice vs. Law:
Courts and Politics in American Society (1993) ("I am always suspicious of an
advocate who comes before the Supreme Court saying this is a court of justice; it is
a court of law.") (unnumbered page); Andrew Roth & Jonathan Roth, Devil's Advo-
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positivism is linked to the insistence on judicial restraint
illustrated by Hand's story. We see the same stance in another
familiar Holmes statement concerning the nature of his "job," a
statement quite reminiscent of his reply to Hand:
I have been in a minority of one as to the proper administration
of the Sherman Act. I hope and believe that I am not influenced by my opinion that it is a foolish law. I have little doubt
that the country likes it and I always say, as you know, that if
my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my
job.10
Happily, the existence or validity of the law/justice distinction
is not my topic. Rather, it is how lawyers, judges, and commentators have used Hand's story that interests me here. I want to
show how others have altered the story to make a point, enlist
an ally, mock a foe, and generally create a narrative that better
supports their own views on that topic.
To Hand, "Holmes was an unblemished idol on the bench.""
Even discounting for the demands of the genre, Hand's two
published tributes to Holmes display a boundless, even fawning,
admiration. 12 Accordingly, he tells the "Do justice!" story
cates: The Unnatural History of Lawyers 124 (1989) (noting that Holmes made such
an observation in "reprimand[ing] a youthful lawyer for his overenthusiasm"). See
also infra note 78.
Perhaps because Hand himself quotes the "I hate justice" comment immediately
before telling his own story, some have combined the two, telling a version of the "do
justice" story in which Holmes tells Hand that his job is to play the game according
to the rules and that he hates justice. See, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Holmes and the
Judicial Figure, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 506, 544 (1988) ("The master craftsman and
inspiring philosopher can also be the narrowest and most unattractive of tacticians.
'I hate justice,' he tells Learned Hand,'... That is not my job. My job is to play the
game according to the rules.'").
10Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1
Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J.
Laski, 1916-1935, at 248-49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HolmesLaski Letters].
11Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 345 (1994). See also id.
at 403 ("Holmes was Hand's idol"); id. at 675 ("[I]nspiration came from his judicial
idol, Oliver Wendell Holmes."). According to Felix Frankfurter, Hand "reverently
called Mr. Justice Holmes 'the Master."' Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 1 (1961).
12 See Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes at 85, in The Spirit of Liberty, supra note
1, at 24; Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 857 (1930), reprinted
in The Spirit of Liberty, supra note 1, at 57 [hereinafter Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes].
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admiringly; it lies in the best-advice-I-ever-had category.
Immediately after the portion set out above he says, "I have
never forgotten that."'1 3 After all, Hand was (or at least
perceived himself to be) thoroughly "commit[ted] ... to the
Holmesian point of view."'1 4 In his narrative, Hand characterizes
himself as not really serious. Clearly, he knows the correction
is coming-he welcomes and agrees with it and is just having a
little fun by saying something both men know to be rather silly.
To Hand, Holmes has something important to say about the
judicial role; he himself has taken Holmes' comment to heart
and he wants his listeners to do the same.
Not everyone who retells this story, however, does so from
that perspective. As the quite different versions of the story told
by Bork and Chayes set out above illustrate, a difference in
purpose and perspective can affect the details of the story itself.
Those with less sympathy for Holmes' position tend to adjust the
factual details or to alter Holmes' statement to cast him in a less
flattering light. On the other hand, those who are relying on
Holmes as an authority, making a "Famous Dead Person"
argument, 5 may adjust the facts or the quotation to fit their own
model of the ideal judge.
I have gathered all of the versions of this oft-recounted story
I could find. (Most are set out in the Appendix.) While it is
not quite true that the story is never told the same way twice,
the variation is impressive. In this Article, I explore the ways in
which people telling the story get it wrong. Through a variety
of subtle alterations to Hand's account, the story is made to
serve the recounter's own purposes.
13 Hand,

supra note 1, at 307.

Letter from Learned Hand to Walter Lippmann (Mar. 3, 1926), quoted in
Gunther, supra note 11, at 386.
14

15The term is from Michael S. Ariens, Dutiful Justice, 22 St. Mary's LJ. 1019, 1020
(1991) (reviewing Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell

Holmes (1989)). Ariens uses the term to describe the tendency to accept certain
arguments merely because they are advanced by a "famous dead person." Holmes is
often the famous dead person invoked in such arguments. For an explicit example of
such a use of the Holmes/Hand story, see South Dakota v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424,
431 (S.D. 1986) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (telling the story and chiding the majority

for ignoring the rules of evidence, explaining, lest anyone miss it, that "[t]he great
Holmes, of course, meant that justice was to be achieved by application of objective
legal rules").
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I. BACKGROUND

We cannot consider how the story has been altered without
first agreeing on an original or correct version. That task is
easier than one might fear. The first quotation set out above is
from an oral presentation by Judge Hand at an ALI/ABA
conference on Continuing Legal Education held at Arden House
in December 1958. This was the winter after Hand had delivered the Holmes lectures at the Harvard Law School, a few
months before the special session of the Second Circuit marking
Hand's half-century on the bench. Hand was 86. The Arden
House talk is included in the third (1960) edition of The Spirit
of Liberty, Irving Dilliard's collection of Hand's incidental
writings and speeches, under the title A Personal Confession.
Hand himself chose the Arden House talk to conclude that
volume.' 6 Though best-known through The Spirit of Liberty, the
talk has also been reprinted elsewhere. 17
While the Arden House talk is the best-known source of
Hand's story, it was hardly the only occasion on which Hand
recounted it. It appeared in print as early as 1926.18 Gerald
Gunther, who clerked for Hand in 1953-54, recalls having heard
the Judge tell it in his presence "at least a couple of times."' 9
No doubt the story has also travelled verbally, on separate
(though overlapping) tracks than its written versions. I know of
only two other accounts directly from Hand himself, however.
Both are nearly identical to and closely contemporaneous with
the Arden House version. First, it was one of three stories
16 Hand,

supra note 1, at 302.
17The speech, or the relevant portion thereof, is set out verbatim in Ruggero J.
Aldisert, The Judicial Process 184-85 (1976); Charles P. Curtis, Law As Large As Life:
A Natural Law for Today and the Supreme Court as its Prophet 156-60 (1959); Eva
H. Hanks, Michael E. Herz & Steven S. Nemerson, Elements of Law 38 (1994);
Justice Holmes Ex Cathedra 229 (Edward J. Bander ed., 1966); Harry C. Shriver,
What Gusto: Stories and Anecdotes About Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 10 (1970).
18 Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, Oliver Wendell Holmes, The New Republic, Dec. 8,
1926, at 59, 63. Sergeant's essay was reprinted as Justice Touched With Fire, in Mr.
Justice Holmes 183 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1931) [hereinafter Sergeant, Justice], and
is usually cited to that volume. Except when referring to the 1926 publication in
particular, I will cite to the 1931 collection, which is more readily available than the
New Republic of December 8, 1926.
19Letter from Gerald Gunther to Michael Herz (June 7, 1994) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
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about Holmes that Hand supplied to Mark DeWolfe Howe in
1959 when the latter was working on Holmes' biography,20 and
second, it is set out in a 1960 letter from Hand to Professor Ray
2

Henson. 1
Whether Hand's account is itself historically accurate is not
important for present purposes. The point is that he seems to

have been quite consistent in how he told it. Indeed, the letter
to Professor Henson shows that it mattered to Hand that the
details and the quotation be correct, suggesting he was probably
consistent in telling it. Most importantly, the Arden House talk
is widely available and wholly dominates all other sources.

Thus, in considering how the story has been altered in the
retelling, it seems reasonable to take the Arden House version
as the original.

II. THE NARRATIVE
A. Incidental FactualErrors

Various accounts of the Hand-Holmes exchange modify the
facts. For example, although it is too little too late, Hand
several times receives the promotion to the Supreme Court he
was denied while still alive.22 One version identifies Holmes'
20

Letter from Learned Hand to Mark DeWolfe Howe (Apr. 29, 1959) (attachment
2) (on file at Harvard Law School under Hand Papers, Box 90, File 31).
21 Letter from Learned Hand to Ray Henson (Jan. 11, 1960) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association), quoted in Ray D. Henson, Preface to The Law of
Sales ix (1985). Hand quotes Holmes as stating: "Young fellar, that is not my job. My
job is to play the game according to the rules."
22 Those who mistakenly refer to "Justice Hand" include Michael A. Hammer,
Comment, The Constitutional, Judicial and Social Pitfalls Attendant to the
Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse: A Plea for Governmental
Uniformity and Mercy, 22 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1456, 1500 n.214 (1992), and George F.
Will, The Tempting of America, Newsweek, Dec. 4, 1989, at 96. Will's error is quoted
without correction in George Anastaplo, Bork on Bork, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1142, 1154
(1990) (reviewing Bork, supra note 2).
One author recounting the story refers to "Judge Learned Hand of the New York
Court of Appeals." Jack Harrison Pollack, Mr. Justice, Mr. Politics, N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1982, at A23. While Hand did sit on a Court of Appeals in New York, it was not,
of course, the New York Court of Appeals. Like "Justice Hand," this misstatement
also awards Judge Hand a judicial post that he missed during his lifetime. In 1913
Hand was the Progressive Party's candidate for Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals. Refusing to campaign or make any public appearances because he was
a sitting judge, Hand garnered only 13% of the vote. Gunther, supra note 11, at 233-
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interlocutor as Louis Brandeis, whom Holmes addresses as
"Louie. '23 Another puts them in an automobile. 24 And several
add the dramatic touch of having the two men part on the steps

of the Supreme Court.25 Indeed, Judge Joseph Bellacosa milks
the Supreme Court setting for all its worth, noting that the
exchange took place "on the steps of the imposing Tribunal on
whose upper pediment appears the frieze message: Equal Justice
Under Law. '26 Unfortunately, that "imposing Tribunal" was
completed only after Holmes' death; Hand's story takes place
outside the Capitol, where the Court sat until 1935.
Others do not alter the basic facts, but they invent additional
details. While everyone agrees that the two men were going to

the Court (that being a narrative necessity if Hand's admonition
is to make sense),27 there is disagreement as to where they were
37.
23Emil Poggi, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, §4, at 24 ("'No,
Louie,' Holmes replied, 'that is not our job. We are here to enforce the laws, not to
do justice."').
24 During Justice Breyer's confirmation hearings, Senator Cohen told the nominee
the story, describing Hand and Holmes as "driving in an automobile past the Supreme
Court." Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1994) [hereinafter Breyer Hearings].
25 See Gary J. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Soldier, Scholar, Judge 140
(1989); Electronic Mail Message from Steven Loffredo to Michael Herz (Sept. 20,
1994) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing "the two giants
strolling toward the base of the Supreme Court stairs; as Holmes ascends, Hand calls
after him"). Mark Tushnet's account is ambiguous in this regard; he has Holmes
"leaving to go to the Supreme Court." Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 108 (1988). Senator Cohen has Holmes and
Hand driving "past the Supreme Court." See Breyer Hearings, supra note 24, at 230.
26 Joseph W. Bellacosa, Foreword, 1992 Annual Survey of New York Law, 44
Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 1 (1993).
27 In one version of the story Holmes is on his way to the Court in the professional
rather than the geographic sense. This takes place at a farewell dinner in Massachusetts. As Holmes was leaving the dinner, a guest reportedly said, "Now justice will be
administered in Washington." Holmes replied, "Don't be too sure. I am going there
to administer the law." Justice Holmes Ex Cathedra, supra note 17, at 213 (citing
Butler, A Century at the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States 50-51 (1942))
(emphasis in original). See also Peter Hay, The Book of Legal Anecdotes 226 (1989)
(recounting an almost identical story); Wallace Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court 116 (2d ed. 1966) ("An old story has it that when Holmes
departed to assume his duties on the Supreme Court he was admonished to do Justice.
He responded thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce the law."). It is possible
that these really were two separate incidents, and Holmes had the good fortune to
have a cooperative straight man not once, but twice. (It is even possible that Hand
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coming from. In A PersonalConfession, Hand does not tell us.2s
Many others, however, feel the need to do so. The most
popular addition is that they had gone out to lunch together,29
though some have Hand simply accompanying Holmes to work

in the morning 30 or running into him on the street.3'

Another sort of addition is to say when the exchange occurred. Hand does not give a date other than to say that it was
"before we had a motor car." 32 Some dodge the uncertainty as
to the date, venturing only to say that the conversation took
place "some years ago" (as of 1926),33 "a very long time ago" (as
had heard the older story and, consciously or unconsciously, was replaying the scene.)
My hunch, however, is that a game of telephone is being played here. The two stories
are suspiciously alike not only in the verbal exchange, but in their narrative details:
In both, someone calls out to Holmes as he is walking away, headed (though in this
case more abstractly) for the Supreme Court.
28His letter to Professor Henson says that they were coming from Holmes' house.
Henson, supra note 21, at ix.
29 Bork, supra note 2, at 6; Chayes, supra note 3, at 1041; Terence Moran, The
Emperors Have No Robes, Wash. Monthly, May 1992, at 41 (reviewing David Savage,
Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court (1992)).
30 William M. Wiecek, Liberty Under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life
76 (1988) ("Learned Hand once recounted an incident that occurred when he
accompanied Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to work one morning."). See also
Sergeant, Justice, supra note 18, at 206 (Holmes said to be "driving... to the Capitol
one morning.")
31Colin K. Kaufman, Comment, Bringing Chaos Out of Order: Truth in Lending in
the Courts, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 937, 943 (1976).
32 Hand, supra note 1, at 306. A more diligent researcher than I could learn when
that was. A few clues in recent biographies suggest that Holmes began riding in an
automobile in the early or middle 1920s. Describing Washington in the 1920s, Liva
Baker writes:
Like the rest of the country, Washington had adopted the automobile. Gas
fumes and "vehicular casualties"--9,400 in 1925-deterred all but the most
determined pedestrians, and parking problems-the entire Mall had become an
open-air garage-dominated cocktail party small talk. Traffic congestion
mounted.... Holmes resisted the automobile for some years and continued to
take his daily drives in a hired horse and buggy, catching cabs for longer jaunts
and, always, the train to Beverly Farms in summer. He finally succumbed to the
"inevitable," but he never owned an automobile; he hired it by the month,
complete with driver; that way, Holmes reasoned, he couldn't be sued.
Liva Baker, The Justice From Beacon Hill: The Life and Times of Oliver Wendell
Holmes 585 (1991). In describing Holmes' routine "about 1925," Sheldon Novick
writes: "The secretary would help him down the front steps when it was time for
Charles Buckley, the coachman turned chauffeur, to drive him to the Court in a rented
motorcar." Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell
Holmes 354, 478 n.71 (1989).
33 Sergeant, Justice, supra note 18, at 206.
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of 1985),34 and "many years ago" (as of 1992).35 No one suggests
that it took place outside of the period between 1902 and 1932,
Holmes' dates of service on the Court. But most of the
possibilities within those 30 years are covered. One writer says
it took place when Hand "was just beginning a celebrated
judicial career of his own"3 6 (Hand became a district judge in
37
1909), another that it occurred "late in [Holmes'] career"
(Holmes retired in 1932). We learn that the incident occurred
"about 1915, ' ' 38 and "in the 1920's"; 39 that it occurred when

Hand was in his sixties and Holmes in his eighties 40 (a time that,
given the 31-year gap in the two mens' ages, never existed 4l);

that it occurred when the two were already "old friends." 42

The errors ("Justice" Hand, steps of the Supreme Court,

driving in an automobile, etc.) reflect carelessness more than

anything else. Some are transferred from another source; others
are perhaps sloppy but understandable. None is especially
significant except as a testament to scholarly carelessness and a
reminder that student citechecking is not perfect.

Henson, supra note 21, at ix.
Moran, supra note 29, at 41.
Id.
37 Aichele, supra note 25, at 140.
38 Charles E. Wyzanski, quoted in The Work of Justice, Time, May 5, 1958, at 15,
1739n.*, reprinted in 104 Cong. Rec. 8237, 8238 n.3 (1958).
William H. Harbaugh, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis 264 (1973).
40 Arthur S. Miller, A Justice Who Did Justice, Wash. Post, May 22, 1977, at E5
(reviewing Gerald T. Dunne, Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution (1977)).
41 Hand was born in 1872, and so only turned 60 just after Holmes retired from the
bench. Therefore the exchange could not have taken place when Hand was in his
sixties. Holmes was born in 1841 and so was in his eighties from 1921 to 1931, a year
before his retirement.
42 "One Saturday, old friends, Judge Learned Hand and Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, shared a ride in a coupe." James L. McAlister, Comment, A Pigment of the
Imagination: Looking at Affirmative Action Through Justice Scalia's Color-Blind
Rule, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 327, 327 (1994). I concede some ambiguity in this sentence.
It is possible that in referring to "old friends," this author means two friends who were
old, an interpretation supported by the statement, two sentences later, that "Hand
decided to goad his older friend." Id. Given that by the time Holmes and Hand were
"old friends" they were also friends who were old, we need not resolve this puzzle.
(It is also possible that the readership of the Marquette Law Review is just very
elderly, and/or very loyal, and so appropriately addressed as "old friends" rather than,
say, "dear reader." However, the sentence's last comma indicates that Holmes and
Hand were indeed the friends in question.)
34
35
36
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The additions (returning from lunch, a particular date) are
more significant. They attest to the storyteller's need to situate
the narrative. 43 Doing so lends the tale authenticity-this really
happened, here's the spot-and, therefore, authority. Hand
himself shows the same tendency. The details that the conversation occurred on a Saturday and that they rode in a horse-drawn
carriage, for example, are irrelevant to the point of the story.
They add to it nonetheless, just like the inventions of later
narrators. Indeed, the additions arise out of the same impulse
as choosing to tell the story at all, rather than just asserting
"Justice Holmes favored (or, I favor) judicial restraint."
B. Meaningful Revisions

The particularerrors or additions described above are not an
effort to turn the story into something it is not. Other factual
modifications, in contrast, are less harmless. They result from
a desire to have the story make a particular point. Those who,
with Holmes, "hate justice" modify the story so as to make
Holmes appear wise and thoughtful and Hand youthful and
naive, or at least jocular. Those who, shall we say, "love justice"
alter the facts so that Holmes becomes fierce, even monstrous,
and dangerous. These changes have little or nothing to do with
what the two men say; they are all in the style and the narrative
detail.
Consider Robert Bork's creative version:
There is a story that two of the greatest figures in our law,
Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, had lunch together
and afterward, as Holmes began to drive off in his carriage,
Hand, in a sudden onset of enthusiasm, ran after him, crying,
"Do justice, sir, do justice." Holmes stopped the carriage and
43 There are occasional exceptions to the tendency to add facts, and they provide a
lesson in how to tell a story. The comment discussed in the preceding footnote bucks
the trend by deleting details. It begins, "One Saturday, old friends, Judge Learned
Hand and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, shared a ride in a coupe." Id. Now that

is not exactly focusing in on the essential.

The author continues,

"At their

destination, Holmes stepped down and walked away." Id. The failure to identify the

destination detracts from the force and the sense of the narrative. The whole point
is that Holmes is on his way to the Court; it is there that he will, or will not, "do
justice."
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reproved Hand: "That is not my job. It is my job to apply the
law."44
Bork goes on to quote from an opinion of his own in which "I
meant something like that."45 He wants to associate himself with
Holmes. And he has a particular Holmes in mind: not the nasty,
amoral believer that might makes right, but the wise voice of
judicial restraint and the rule of law.
To this end, Bork decorates the story with a number of factual
additions. 46 For example, he has Hand not merely call to
Holmes but "r[u]n after him, crying" out his exhortation. The
result is to make Hand (and thus his suggestion that Holmes "do
justice") look somewhat ridiculous; his panting ignorance is
contrasted with Holmes' calm, adult wisdom. Holmes does not
"reply" or "respond," he "reproves," like a parent; Hand does
not "say" or "urge," he "cries," like a child. Whereas Hand
portrays himself as mischievous, Bork ascribes to him "a sudden
onset of enthusiasm," underlined by the fact that he cries out
"do justice" not once but twice. Hand is visceral, Holmes
cerebral; Hand is a bit out of control, Holmes thoroughly in
control.
Strikingly, Bork has Holmes drive away from Hand in the carriage. In both sources that Bork cites, as well as virtually every
other telling of the story, both men get out of the carriage and
Holmes walks away from Hand, who calls after him. 47 Leaving
Holmes in the carriage has important consequences. First, as
noted, it forces Hand to run after him in this rather silly fashion.
Second, the merits of their substantive statements (and their
relative judicial positions) are recapitulated in their physical
relationship. Holmes is above, looking down on Hand below.
44 Bork, supra note 2, at 6.
45 Id.
46 Bork cites two sources: the Sergeant piece from 1931 and Harry Shriver's
collection of Holmes' quotes and stories, What Gusto, which in turn sets out Hand's
Arden House speech. Both are inconsistent with Bork's version in every aspect I
discuss in text, as well as with regard to what Holmes said, as I discuss infra at text
accompanying notes 90-92.
47 Judge Wyzanski seems to leave Holmes in the carriage as well, but does not have
Hand run after him: "As they approached their destination, the district judge left the
carriage and, waving farewell, called out, 'Do justice, sir.' Sharply he was summoned
back." See The Work of Justice, supra note 38, at 17 n.* (quoting Judge Charles E.
Wyzanski).

1996]

"Do Justice!"

Moreover, he does not even turn; another detail present in
virtually every other retelling of the story. Finally, while Bork

is not completely clear, he gives the impression that Holmes is
driving the carriage himself: "Holmes began to drive off";
"Holmes stopped the carriage." This both confirms that Holmes
is in control-he is literally holding the reins-and enhances the

impression of Holmes' competence. Not only is he America's
greatest jurist, he can handle horses too. Needless to say, it is
quite clear that in fact Holmes did not drive his own carriage;

again, this is apparent from, if nothing else, the very sources that
Bork cites. 48
In short, Bork modifies the story's details in important ways
in order to be more sure of the effect. Others invoking Holmes
as an authority describe his manner similarly. For example, a
newspaper columnist who shares Bork's skepticism about judges
who seek to "do justice" expressed his reservations about thennominee Stephen Breyer thus: "Justice Holmes, a towering
figure in our judicial history, didn't promise to make the law
'work for the people.' Holmes soberly and somberly declared

that his job was simply to 'apply the law."' 49 Similarly, Raoul
Berger, quoting Wallace Mendelson, describes Holmes not as
"sober and somber" but as "thoughtful": "It is said that when
Holmes left the Massachusetts Court for the Supreme Court, 'he

was admonished to do justice. He responded thoughtfully that

48 Elizabeth Sergeant's version, which Bork cites, even includes a dated and
awkward reference to "a highly respectable coloured coachman on the box."
Sergeant, Justice, supra note 18, at 206.
Incidentally, Bork's version, complete with his citations, is repeated word for word,
and without attribution, in In re Funding Sys. Asset Management Corp., 111 B.R. 500,
502 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (Markovitz, J.). Whereas Judge Bork includes citations
but departs from his sources, Judge Markovitz is utterly true to his source but does not
include a citation. Perhaps this is because the stuff we really like we try to pass off
as our own; the stuff that is merely helpful we only adjust to fit our needs (as the
freedom with which Hand's story is used, by Bork and others, shows). Cf. T. S. Eliot,
The Sacred Wood 125 (3d ed. 1932) ("immature poets imitate; mature poets steal").
49 Richard Grenier, Two Cheers, No More, for the Court in Brown, Wash. Times,
May 25, 1994, at A17. Breyer himself, on the other hand, found support for his
position in this story, asserting that Holmes' point was that the legal system must
"work[ out for society in a way that is better for people rather than worse." Breyer
Hearings, supra note 24, at 231. This peculiar interpretation is discussed infra at notes
98-102 and accompanying text.
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his job was merely to enforce the law."' 50 These authors give us
a Holmes who is firm without being fierce, leaving an impression
of calm wisdom and patient forbearance.
Not all justice-haters portray Holmes as quite so calm. For
example, in a book review in The Washington Monthly, Terence
Moran dismisses as an "illusion" the view that legality and
justice should correspond. He uses the "Do justice!" story to
make his point. In his version, "The old man wheeled around,
glared at his proteg6, and fired back." 51 Moran portrays Holmes
as somewhat fierce, but still thinking; the intensity of the
response results from the benightedness of Hand's suggestion.
Indeed, a scent of betrayal hangs over Hand, the "proteg6" who
has erred so profoundly. William Wiecek, stressing that "a jurist
betrays his responsibility and his oath when he decides according
to the commands of conscience rather than law" renders Holmes
less fierce, but similarly provoked. 52 He describes Holmes as
responding to Hand "with apparent agitation," 53 again undercutting Hand's substantive position.
Justice-lovers have two choices in portraying Holmes. One alternative is to suggest that Holmes didn't really mean it. Louis
Schwartz, in an article advocating judicial and lawyerly attention
to justice, and to beauty as an element of justice, tries this tack,
coupling it with a hint that Homer may have nodded. Describing positivism, he writes: "So great a man as Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes said, perhaps in jesting response to Judge
Learned Hand's admonition .... 54 The other alternative is to
undercut Holmes by portraying him as wilder and less thoughtful
than the justice-haters characterize him. For example, Arthur S.
Miller has him "thunder[ing] back" to Hand. 55

50 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary 289 n.24 (1977) (quoting Mendelson,
supra note 27, at 116). Berger and Mendelson seem to be combining Hand's story and
the farewell dinner story set out in supra note 27.

51 Moran, supra note 29, at 41.
-2
53
54

Wiecek, supra note 30, at 76.
Id.
Louis B. Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 141, 148

(1987).
55

Miller, supra note 40, at E5.
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Abram Chayes offers the most striking reworking of the story
along these lines.5 6 For Chayes, Holmes' position is anathema.
He tells the story as an example of a mistaken jurisprudence:
"We know [Holmes' assertion] is not true. We know that law is
inevitably concerned with justice.... [T]here is no way to talk
about law without eventually coming to talk about justice." 57 In
his account, when Hand called out "do justice," "The old man
turned on him fiercely, eyebrows bristling. '58 Each word in this
sentence is telling. First, Holmes has become "the old man"; an
outsider, infirm, perhaps an anachronism.5 9 More than that, he
has lost his own name. Rightly or wrongly, that name is the
most resonant and well-known in the history of the American
judiciary. The switch from "Oliver Wendell Holmes" to "the old
man" is a huge first step toward delegitimization. No longer the
56 As we will see, Chayes' version is vastly removed from Hand's. Remarkably,
notwithstanding his extensive alterations, Chayes does cite Hand's Arden House
speech. He does so, however, only "[f]or Judge Hand's version of the story." Chayes,
supra note 3, at 1041 n.78. Apparently Chayes was also present, he just remembers
the exchange differently than did Hand. (I suspect that this formulation was a
compromise between the editors of the law review, who felt obliged to find a cite for
this story, and Professor Chayes, who was unwilling to change his version once the cite
had been found.)
57Id. at 1041-42.
58 Id. at 1041.
59Ironically, Hand himself captured the insult here when, in presenting Holmes'
portrait to the Harvard Law School, he denied that Holmes, then 89, was old:
[W]hile we have been working along at mere terrestrial velocities, he has
certainly not been growing old. Nobody can say that without flagrant disregard
of the obvious, whatever be the records of our wretchedly defective means of
counting time. If it be old to degenerate in will, mind, or feeling, patently he
is not old. If it be old to be muffled by the body, so that a veil falls between us
and our fellows, he is not old. If it be old not to understand youth, its joys, its
aspirations, and its generous warmth, he is not old. If we measure youth by the
power to assimilate what is new, by freshness of outlook, by sympathy, by
understanding, by quickness of response, by affection, by kindness, by
gentleness, by magnanimity, he is not old.
Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, supra note 12, reprinted in Hand, The Spirit of Liberty,
supra note 1, at 64-65.
The negative flavor of the "old man" is contextual. Referring to Holmes as the "old
man" might also indicate his perseverance, toughness, or wisdom. See Moran, supra
note 29, at 41 ("The old man wheeled around, glared at his protege, and fired back
...."). Holmes described himself as "the old man" in a letter to Pollock upon his
70th birthday. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Mar. 12,
1911), in 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters 178 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961) ("Tell
[Lady Pollock] the old man swept round the last post to the home stretch going
strong.").

126

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:111

Yankee from Olympus, he is the Wizard of Oz revealed behind
the curtain. Second, this old man does not turn to Hand, he
turns on him, like an animal. As in Wiecek's account, there is
a suggestion of betrayal, but now Holmes is the betrayer,
suddenly "turning on" his friend. Third, Holmes' attack is
"fierce," his "eyebrows bristling." Apart from the fact that if
any eyebrows were bristling during this exchange they were

Hand's famously exuberant ones,6° this last touch confirms the
animalistic imagery. Holmes is aggressive, angry, unreasoning.
(It is probably going overboard to discover in the pair of
bristling eyebrows a hint of an animal's, or the devil's, horns.)
In short, Chayes flips the characteristics suggested by Bork's

version; now Hand is cerebral, Holmes visceral.
More is at work here than just a desire to liven up the story,
though that is part of it. Each narrator decorates the story with
details that subtly support the substantive point being made. Of

course, an important reason we tell stories is that they let us
make points in indirect ways. Bork and Chayes purport to tell
the same story, but their versions share little but the characters

and the fact (invented) that they were returning from lunch.
They are making different points and adjust the details accordingly. The modifications to narrative details are an indirect
acknowledgement of the power of narrative. These narrators
60 In addition to any photograph of Hand, see Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Foreword to
Gunther, supra note 11, at xi (referring to Hand's "rugged square features and
imposing eyebrows"); Gunther, supra note 11, at i (referring to Hand's "striking
looks-he was a stocky, barrel-chested man with a square head accented by stiff, gray
hair, thick bushy eyebrows, and large, piercing eyes"). Not that Holmes was a slouch
in the eyebrow department. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 32, at 357 (referring to
Holmes' "silver mustaches and unruly eyebrows"). Cf. William E. Schmidt, Gephardt
Raises Eyebrows With His New Look, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at A22 (reporting
that presidential candidate Richard Gephardt had taken to darkening his eyebrows for
television appearances and quoting a political consultant's speculation that this may
be "a case of eyebrow envy" in light of the fact that Michael Dukakis had "the most
wonderful manly eyebrows of anyone who has ever run for President").
Hand's eyebrows are especially luxuriant-rising upward about as far as his face
extends downward below them-in a caricature by David Levine in the New York
Review of Books accompanying Ronald Dworkin's review of the Gunther biography.
See Ronald Dworkin, Mr. Liberty, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 11, 1994, at 17, 17. The
editors also included a drawing of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Id. at 18. Direct eyebrow
comparison is not possible, however, for unfortunately they chose a drawing of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., not Jr. (The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table's eyebrows are
pretty impressive too, but no match for Hand's.)
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assert control over the factual details, which then become not
just part of their narrative, but part of their argument.
C. Choice of Words

The impression this story makes results not only from the
specifics of the action but from the words used to describe it.
One example in particular tidily illustrates how, without
changing any facts, the meaning of the story changes in the
telling. Telling this story requires a verb for the protagonists'
"speech acts." I discussed above how Robert Bork undermines
Hand and legitimates Holmes by having the first "cry" and the
second "reprove." Retelling the story as told by Judge Bork,
conservative columnist George Will does not make Hand run
after Holmes as Bork does. He achieves something of the same
effect, however, by having Hand "exclaim."' 61 Michael Gerhardt
and Tom Rowe also retell the story as told by Bork, but they
are much less sympathetic to Bork's view of the judicial role
than is George Will.62 In their version, Hand does not "cry" or
even "exclaim"; rather, he "plead[s] with" Holmes to do
justice.63 The verb legitimates Hand's position in a way inconsistent not only with Bork's breathless version but with Hand's
own account, in which his comment is at least partly tongue in
cheek.
One popular term here is "admonish." Hand himself does not
use this word, but many others do. They are revealingly divided,
however, as to who is admonishing whom. The good guy always
admonishes. Thus, when the justice-lovers tell the story, Hand

61 Will, supra note
62 See Michael J.

22, at 96 (reviewing Bork, supra note 2).
Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1358 (1990)

(reviewing,
harshly, Bork, supra note 2).
63

Michael J. Gerhardt & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Constitutional Theory: Arguments

and Perspectives 161 (1993) (citing Bork, supra note 2, at 6).
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"admonishes" Holmes; 64 when the justice-haters tell the story,
Holmes "admonishes" Hand.65
III. WHAT HOLMES SAID

People tell this story because of Holmes' statement about the
judicial task. Both published versions from Hand himself have
the same punchline: "That is not my job. My job is to play the
game according to the rules. 66 Likewise, in the oldest published
version, Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant's 1926 essay, Holmes says
almost the same thing, though with a rather bizarre addition:
I am not here to do justice. I am here to play the game
according to the rules. When I was at the bar and Lowell used
to beat [me], I'd say to him: "Judge, your result may be good,
but it's another game I undertook to play. I gave you a thrust
in fierce and you countered with a bag of potatoes over my
head." 67

64See Schwartz, supra note 54, at 148 ("Holmes said, perhaps in jesting response to
Judge Learned Hand's admonition to 'do Justice': 'Young feller, that is not my job."').
Wallace Mendelson, who himself feels the pull of both positions, reveals that
ambivalence in his choice of words here. On the one hand, he has Holmes' (in this
case unnamed) interlocutor "admonish" him to do justice. But this is balanced by
having Holmes "respondo thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce the law."
Mendelson, supra note 27, at 116.
Some narrators have Hand "enjoin" Holmes to do justice, which has a similar ring
to it. See Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 370 n.2
(1987); Miller, supra note 40, at E5.
65 See In re George Cindrich Gen. Contracting, 130 B.R. 20, 21 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1991) ("In admonishing Hand, Justice Holmes advised that it was not his duty or
prerogative to do justice."); Bruce Fein, On Reading the Constitution, 90 Mich. L.
Rev. 1225, 1228 (1992) (book review) ("Justice Holmes echoed those sentiments in
admonishing Judge Learned Hand that the judicial duty is not to invoke a personal
standard of justice but to play the game according to the rules."); Gerhardt, supra
note 62, at 1392 ("Bork relates an anecdote in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
admonished Judge Learned Hand that Holmes's job was not to do justice ....Bork
praises Holmes for this admonition."); McAlister, supra note 42, at 327 ("'That is not
my job,' Holmes admonished."). I include Gerhardt among the justice-haters here
because he is describing Bork's use of the story.
66Hand, supra note 1, at 307; Henson, supra note 21, at ix. In his letter to Howe,
Hand quotes Holmes almost identically: "That is not my business. I am here to play
the game according to the rules." Letter to Howe, supra note 20. On the change
from "job" to "business," see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
67Sergeant, Justice, supra note 18, at 206-07.
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Who knows what to make of the reminiscence about Judge
Lowell? Were it not written almost seven decades ago one might
attribute its appearance to a problem with the word processor's
cut and paste feature. In any event, Sergeant's version is
essentially consistent with Hand's, varying only in the "I am
here" in place of "My job is." Thus, all four "original" versions
of the story-the three recorded versions from Hand himself and
the oldest and only roughly contemporaneous version-have
Holmes asserting that a judge is not to "do justice" but "to play
the game according to the rules."
What does this mean? The comment is like a Holmes
opinion: short, memorable, epigrammatic, inscrutable, and
revealing much less than it purports to. Holmes' comment might
be read as an insistence on judicial restraint, or as an endorsement of the separation thesis, or as a jurisprudential description
of law as a set of rules. I think it is best read as a statement
about the confines of the judicial role-a statement more of
political science than jurisprudence. But, again, the "correct"
understanding of Holmes' meaning matters less for present
purposes than the way the quotation is altered to reflect one or
another of these three ideas and to render Holmes' view
admirable or indefensible. In a significant number of instances,
Holmes' words are subtly, but importantly, altered. In what way
exactly depends, once again, on whether the narrator wants to
praise or trash Holmes and on the narrator's own preferred
version of the judicial role.
Perhaps the most extreme liberties with Hand's version are
taken by Professor Chayes, who gives Holmes' response as:
"Justice? What's that? That's none of my business. Law is my
business." 68 Chayes' article aims to establish that law is inescapably and appropriately concerned with justice. He modifies
Holmes' statement of the contrary view, making "the old man"
a straw man. As rescripted, Holmes asserts not merely that law
and justice are unconnected, but that they are in direct opposition. Holmes does not even know what justice is; he has never
heard of it. His tone is hostile and aggressive. Holmes mocks
something most people (including positivists) value, whether
68 Chayes,

supra note 3, at 1041.

130

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:111

they think judges should be pursuing it directly or not. Holmes
is not agnostic; he is malevolent and belligerent. He must be

wrong.
Chayes makes one other subtle but significant change.
Holmes referred to his "job"; Chayes has him refer to his
"business." The two are not the same. A "business" is pursued
for personal gain rather than the greater good; a "job"is a form
of service. More importantly, "job" was a loaded term for
Holmes. It connoted modest, practical, and nontransformative
goals along with an intense concern for craft and professionalism. 69 Holmes liked to talk about his imaginary "Society of
Jobbists," whose members turned their backs on reform and
idealism in favor of concentrated and craftsmanlike attention to
the task at hand. 70 Jobbists believed that in doing "one's job as

well as one can one achieves practical altruism." 71 Hand himself
celebrated Holmes as a "Jobbist," developing the theme
extensively in his tribute at the unveiling of Holmes' Harvard

69 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Speech at Bar Dinner, in Collected Legal Papers 244,
247 (1920). See also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 787, 846-47, 859-61 (1989) (describing Holmes' "Jobbist" or "professionalistic"
work ethic).
70 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 32, at 96; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Harold J. Laski (Dec. 9, 1921), in 1 Holmes-Laski Letters, supra note 10, at 385;
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C. Wu (Mar. 26,1925), in Justice Holmes
to Doctor Wu, supra note 9, at 27 ("true view" of "the necessary foundation for a
noble life" "was that of my imaginary society of jobbists").
71 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (July 17, 1909), in The
Holmes-Einstein Letters 48 (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964). See also Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Class of '61, in Speeches 95, 96 (1934) (telling 50th reunion of
his college class that "the best service that we can do for our country [is] ... to
hammer out as compact and solid a piece of work as one can, to try to make it first
rate, and to leave it unadvertised"); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sidney Bartlett, in The
Occasional Speeches of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 51, 54 (Mark DeWofe Howe
ed., 1962) ("[T]he beginning of self-sacrifice and holiness-is to do one's task with
one's might."). Whether at bottom all this truly reflects the modesty and judicial
humility that it, somewhat self-contradictorily, advertises may be doubted. G. Edward
White says that in fact Holmes' paeans to Jobbism are "the logical culmination of his
own self-confidence in being a gifted professional." G. Edward White, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self 296 (1993).
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Law School portrait. 72 With Chayes' substitution of "business"
for "job," all this disappears. 73
Mark Tushnet's changes are less extreme than Chayes', but in

the same direction:
One day, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was leaving to go
to the Supreme Court, a friend said to him, "Well, off to do

justice again!" Holmes is said to have replied, "Sonny, I don't
do justice; I just make sure that people play by the rules." 74

By replacing "That's not my job" with "I don't do justice,"
Tushnet, like a clever lawyer at a deposition or on crossexamination, gets Holmes to condemn himself. Holmes' actual
words leave open the possibility that justice will be done because

judges play the game according to the rules, ensuring, to quote
the Supreme Court frieze, "equal justice under law." 75 Indeed

77 Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, supra note 12, at 62.
Of course, the Jobbists can be described unsympathetically as well. In a tribute to
Judge J. Skelly Wright, Justice Brennan celebrates the fact that Skelly Wright was not
a Jobbist:
Holmes' imaginary society of Jobbists is limited to judges who hold a tight rein
on humanitarian impulse and compassionate action, stoically doing their best to
discover and apply already existing rules. But judges acting on the former view
[i.e., that the ultimate concern of law is justice], and Skelly Wright was one,
believe that the judicial process demands a good deal more than that.... [A]
just choice between competing alternatives has to be made to decide concrete
cases.
Brennan, supra note 5, at 361-62. It was unnecessary for Brennan to observe to which
camp he himself belonged.
73 To be fair, Hand himself also substitutes "business" for "job" in one of his own
accounts of the exchange. See Letter to Howe, supra note 20.
74
Tushnet, supra note 25, at 108. Tushnet is virtually the only person to retell this
story with Hand saying something other than simply the imperative "do justice." The
tone of "Well, off to do justice again!" is hard to read; perhaps it is naively enthusiastic, perhaps sarcastic, perhaps self-conscious, perhaps belittling. Whatever it is,
though, it is decidedly not a useful endorsement of justice-based judging. Tushnet
goes on to attack such an approach as indeterminate and unworkable. He therefore
has no stake in making Hand sound good either--quite the contrary. Thus, Tushnet
tells the story in a way that undercuts both the Holmesian and the "do justice"
positions.
Note also that Tushnet does not identify Hand. The reader does not know that the
"friend" is famous, sophisticated, and supportive of Holmes' position.
75 See State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424,431 (S.D. 1986) (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(interpreting Holmes to have meant that "justice was to be achieved by the application
of objective legal rules") (emphasis added). In its more extreme (perhaps tautological) form, this view is not that justice is achieved because judges play by the rules, but
that justice consists of playing by the rules.
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76
both Holmes and Hand would endorse such a view of justice.
At the least, judges will achieve "justice as regularity" by playing
according to the rules.77 As Frederick Schauer has written,
expressing a view to which Holmes would be sympathetic, "[a]n

"Justice" in this sense means legality; it is "just" for a general rule to be actually
applied in all cases where, according to its content, this rule should be applied.
It is "unjust" for it to be applied in one case and not in another similar case.
And this seems "unjust" without regard to the value of the general rule itself,
the application of which is under consideration.
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 14 (1945). See also Roscoe Pound,
Justice According to Law, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 696 (1913) (tracing the intersection of
rules and judicial discretion in the administration of justice).
76 Without being sidetracked on a lengthy discourse about Holmes' view of justice,
I would only note that in his opinions, he tends to invoke the idea of justice where
others might instead use the language of legality. What is "unjust" for Holmes is to
impose requirements that cannot really qualify as law at all. Liability without notice
or pursuant to changed, retroactive, invalid, or unknowable laws would be unjust; the
substantive result itself is not a matter of justice or injustice as long as the proceedings
are fair and, in particular, there has been no unfair surprise. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 200 (1915) (Holmes, J.) ("It would seem a
miscarriage of justice if the plaintiff should recover upon a statute that did not govern
the case, in a suit that the same act declared too late to be maintained."); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914) (Holmes, J.) ("The injustice of
imposing a greater liability than that created by the law governing the conduct of the
parties at the time of the act or omission complained of is obvious .... "); Noble v.
Gallardo y Seary, 223 U.S. 65, 66 (1912) (Holmes, J.) (rejecting lower court's reliance
on the doctrine of laches, since such an equitable principle was a quite recent
introduction to the jurisdiction and "it would be unjust to apply [equitable] doctrines
to the conduct of the parties during the many years that were not governed by any
rule peculiar to chancery courts"); Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 539 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me a miscarriage of justice to sustain liability
under a statute which possibly, and I think probably, is unconstitutional, until the facts
have been heard which the petitioner alleged and offered to prove."); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,356 (1909) (Holmes, J.) (noting that it
would be "unjust" for a country to impose liability for acts done in, and legal under
the law of, another country). Similar invocations of justice are found in Holmes'
opinions in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 213 U.S. 52, 54 (1909); Spreckels v.
Brown, 212 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1909); and Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,
396 (1905).
Holmes' catalogue of injustice is very much like Lon Fuller's catalogue of the "eight
distinct routes to disaster" for a legal system; that is, the ways in which a system may
fail to achieve something we can call "law" at all. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality
of Law 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969). Both rest on a fundamental principle that laws must be
capable of being known and complied with.
As for Hand, see Kathryn Griffith, Judge Learned Hand and the Role of the
Federal Judiciary 11 (1973) ("A common thread ran through his decisions-his deep
concern for justice according to the rules as he understood them.").
77See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 235-39 (1971).
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agent who says, 'This is not my job,' is not necessarily abdicating
responsibility. One form of taking responsibility consists in
taking the responsibility for leaving certain responsibilities to
78

others."
Professor Tushnet himself rejects this view of justice and of
the judicial role.79 Whether or not this view holds up, it is no
78

Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules 162 (1991) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g.,
Mendelson, supra note 27, at 116-18 (interpreting the story to mean that justice results
from each governmental actor's acceptance of its assigned task). Chief Justice
Burger's use of the story has some of this feel, although it is awfully tentative: "Our
duty ... is not to do justice but to apply the law and hope that justice is done."
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 402 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
Here is another Holmes story, much like Hand's in many ways, that puts this thesis
to the test. Three times Holmes denied stays for Sacco and Vanzetti, the last at 9:00
p.m. the night before their execution. After the second denial, he is reported to have
told defense counsel: "I am convinced that these men did not get a square deal, but
we cannot take the United States Government into State affairs and undermine the
basic principles of the separate sovereignties of the State and Federal governments."
Michael A. Musmanno, After Twelve Years 300 (1939). After Holmes had denied a
stay, his clerk, Thomas Corcoran, ventured to ask, "But has justice been done, Sir?"
According to Corcoran, Holmes replied:
Don't be foolish, boy. We practice law, not "justice." There is no such thing
as objective "justice," which is a subjective matter. A man might feel justified
in stealing a loaf of bread to fill his belly; the baker might think it most just for
the thief's hand to be chopped off, as in Victor Hugo's Les Miserables. The
image of justice changes with the beholder's viewpoint, prejudice or social
affiliation. But for society to function, the set of rules agreed on by the body
politic must be observed-the law must be carried out.
Baker, supra note 32, at 607-08 (quoting Thomas G. Corcoran & Philip Kopper,
Rendezvous with Democracy: The Memoirs of "Tommy the Cork" 23-26 (unpublished
manuscript in the Thomas G. Corcoran papers in the Library of Congress)). As
Thomas Grey observed in drawing this passage to my attention, this is a suspiciously
verbatim transcript. Nonetheless, Holmes' letters from around the time of the Sacco
and Vanzetti execution do repeatedly return to this theme. While claiming that his
"prejudices" lay with the condemned men, he insisted that their claim simply did not
amount to a constitutional issue that would justify the federal judiciary's interference
in this state prosecution. He defended himself against accusations of injustice by
pointing to legal constraints that stood in the way of his pursuing justice. See Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Aug. 18, 1927), in 2 Holmes-Laski
Letters, supra note 10, at 970-71; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J.
Laski (Aug. 24, 1927), in id. at 974; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis
Einstein (Aug. 14, 1927), in The Holmes-Einstein Letters, supra note 71, at 271-72.
His actions in this case subjected Holmes to enormous criticism and some strain.
Notwithstanding his repeated and somewhat impatient insistence that his hands were
tied and that there was no basis for the issuance of a stay, this may have been the
point in Holmes' professional life where the law/justice distinction was at its starkest.
79 He makes this position clear in a well-known article with a title strikingly
appropriate for the present discussion. See Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
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longer even available under Tushnet's version (which would
have been significantly milder had he had Holmes say, "I don't
'do justice"'). Here, Holmes himself asserts that he is unjust.
Tushnet's second change, from "my job is to play the game
according to the rules" to "I just make sure that people play by
the rules," also alters the meaning and effect of Holmes'
statement. As reported by Hand, Holmes' comment seems to be
about judicial restraint, emphasizing that there are limitations on
the judicial role (though without revealing what those limitations
are). It is the judge who is playing "the game," and his play is
constrained by "the rules." On this reading, Holmes might still
be read to preserve significant judicial discretion; he does not
reveal what the judge's proper role is, only that it has firm
boundaries and does not deputize the judge as, in Cardozo's
words, "a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own
'80
ideal of beauty or of goodness.
As reworded by Tushnet, Holmes is instead making a comment about the nature of law, implying that it consists of a set
of rules, like other games, such as chess or football. This is not
Holmes the paragon of judicial restraint but Holmes the
positivist. These two views of what Holmes was talking aboutpolitical science or jurisprudence-are of course connected. Our
understanding of what "law" is will be reflected in our rules for
judging. Furthermore, adhering to rules is in itself a form of
self-restraint because it is a means of deferring to decisionmaking by others, i.e. those who made the rules. Applying rules
allocates power among decisionmakers. 81 As Justice Scalia in
particular has emphasized, a jurisprudence of rule-following
implies a norm of judicial restraint. 82 Still, the two are not the
same. Tushnet's rephrasing eliminates any ambiguity here in
favor of the second viewpoint. Tushnet wants Holmes' point to
be that law is only a set of rules, divorced from the pursuit of
3
justice. 8
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781

(1983).

80 Benjamin

N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1925).

81Schauer, supra note 78, at 161.

82 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,

1176-80 (1989).

83 Stephen Diamond performs a similar reformulation of Holmes' words, though
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Furthermore, as Philip Bobbitt pointed out in reviewing
Tushnet's book, "[t]here is a world of difference between, on the

one hand, trying conscientiously to play by the rules and, on the
other hand, seeing your task as making others do so." 4 The
latter implies an unempathetic haughtiness and a freedom from
the rules for oneself. At best, this is the petty bureaucrat's

unthinking rule fetishism; at worst it is a cynical and dictatorial
abuse of authority. 5
Finally, Tushnet's insertion of the word "just"-"I don't do
justice. I just make sure people play be the rules"-emphasizes,
in a punning, sarcastic way, the gap between the ideal of justice
and the reality of Holmes' jurisprudence. Tushnet means "just"
in the sense of "merely"; the word play emphasizes the contrast
between the two judicial goals. 86 Holmes is not "just" in the
without presenting it as an actual quotation:
[Holmes'] stance was that of a demoralized-in its nineteenth-century
meaning, a state of being without moral concerns-aristocrat, simply holding
every party to its agreements and to the rules, but without much confidence,
or even interest, in the particular results. This demoralized perspective is
central to Holmes' jurisprudence. Law is obedience to rules rather than a
quest for justice.
Stephen Diamond, Citizenship, Civilization, and Coercion: Justice Holmes on the Tax
Power, in The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 115, 146 (Robert W. Gordon ed.,
1992). Diamond states that "[a]ccording to Learned Hand, Holmes denied that as a
judge he did justice, and admitted only to enforcing the rules." Id at 283 n.115.
84 Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1233, 1301 (1989) (reviewing
Tushnet, supra note 25).
95 The same haughtiness comes through in a version of the story told to me by
Professor Steve Loffredo of the CUNY Law School, who recalls (not with complete
confidence) having heard it this way as a first-year law student of Professor Chayes.
Hand calls to Holmes as the latter is ascending the Supreme Court stairs. "Holmes
looks back disdainfully and replies from above, 'Justice, bah! I interpret the law."'
Electronic Mail Message from Steven Loffredo to Michael Herz, supra note 25. Here
the sense of judicial disconnectedness is emphasized by Holmes' physical placement
"above it all."
86 To make clear that Holmes' definition of the judicial role is a modest one-indeed, to imply that it is too modest-many retellers invent some such adverb or
phrase. See, e.g., Bellacosa, supra note 26, at 1 ("All we do here is apply the rules of
the game!") (emphasis added); Diamond, supra note 83, at 283 n.115 ("Holmes denied
that as a judge he did justice, and admitted only to enforcing the rules ....")
(emphasis added); Grenier, supra note 49, at A17 ("[H]is job was simply to 'apply the
law."') (emphasis added); Harbaugh, supra note 39, at 264 ("All we do is apply the
rules of the game.") (emphasis added); Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues
on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1023, 1038
(1987) ("[Tjhe best that appellate judges can do is to ensure that the game is played
by the rules.") (emphasis added); Mendelson, supra note 27, at 116 (Holmes
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sense of right and moral; he is "just" a narrow rule-enforcer.8 7
While the left adjusts Holmes' comment to make it appear especially harsh and blindered, the right does the opposite,

modifying Holmes' statement so as to reveal, lo and behold, that
Holmes was asserting the basic position of conservative jurists of
the 1980s. In some cases, this is done by attributing to Holmes
an additional elaborative or explanatory phrase. For example,
conservative scholar and columnist Thomas Sowell of the
Hoover Institution has Holmes say that his job was "'to see that

the game is played according to the rules, whether I like them
or not."' 88 Similarly, Bruce Fein has Holmes "admonishing
Judge Learned Hand that the judicial duty is not to invoke a
personal standard of justice but to play the game according to
the rules." 89

, These

additions are arguably consistent with

Holmes' comment, but not necessarily so.

They are also

somewhat anachronistic, owing at least as much to Edwin Meese
as to Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Others reword the basic statement. We saw above, for exam-

ple, that Robert Bork has Holmes say that his job is "to apply
the law." This is a common formulation.90 Both the sources
"responded thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce the law.") (emphasis
added).
87 The pun could cut the other way, however, if playing the game according to the
rules produces, or even defines, justice. On this view, the pun in Tushnet's "I just
make sure" is more positive; it implies "I am just by making sure."
88Thomas Sowell, Integrity Is the Issue, Forbes, Oct. 28, 1991, at 90. Sowell's article
is a familiar attack on the preoccupation in the judicial appointments process with
where a nominee "'stand[s]' on 'issues."' The tone, and message, is captured by the
two sentences the editors set off, highlighted: "It has taken centuries of struggle by
giants to establish 'a government of laws and not of men.' Today, pygmies are trying
to reduce it all to a question of a judge's 'views."' Id.
89 Fein, supra note 65, at 1228.
90 Those who rely on Bork as the source of the story repeat this phrase. See In re
Funding Systems, 111 B.R. at 502; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text:
Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 Duke L.
1, 7 n.22 (1993); Gerhardt & Rowe, supra note 63, at 161; Grenier, supra note 49, at
A17 (not attributing the story to Bork, but using this formulation and referring to
Bork elsewhere in the article); Julius Menacker, Legislative Withdrawal of Administrator Tenure: How Much Process is Due?, 67 Ed. L. Rep. 411, 420 n.29 (July 4, 1991);
Will, supra note 22.
But others also quote Holmes as saying that his job is to "apply the law," either
without citation or with a citation to a source that gives the "play the game according
to the rules" version. See Katharine L. Huth, Garcia Revisited: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Application to Appointed State Court Judges, 59
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Bork cites give the quotation as "play the game according to the
rules." Why would Bork find "apply the law" more congenial?
The consequences of playing the game according to the rules
depend on what those rules are, and Holmes does not tell us.
It may be that the rules call for judges to pursue goals of justice
or fairness in certain circumstances, to meliorate harsh requirements, to temper "justice" with mercy. Playing the game according to the rules might involve large interpretive freedom.
In contrast, to say that judges "apply the law"-not make it, or
even interpret it-emphasizes the limited range of judicial action
and implies that law is simply an accumulation of rules.
Ironically, Bork's alteration is thus very much like Tushnet's.
"Apply the law" and "make others play by the rules" are more
like each other than either is like "play the game according to
the rules." 91 Tushnet and Bork both want Holmes to be endorsing the proposition that law is a relatively inflexible set of rules.
However, Tushnet does so in order to bury Holmes, Bork in
order to praise him. As a result, they use different reformulations: "apply the law" sounds responsible and sober; "make
others play by the rules" sounds tyrannical and incomplete.
In one of the few examples of the use of this story in an
opinion, Chief Justice Burger tracks Bork. In a concurrence in
which he accepts the ordinary, though silly, meaning of the
words of a statute, Burger emphasizes the judiciary's subordinate
policy-making role and the importance of resisting the temptation simply to do "what we regard as the more sensible thing."
"Our duty, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes in a conversation
with Judge Learned Hand, is not to do justice but to apply the
law and hope that justice is done." 92 The idea here is the same:
Fordham L. Rev. 403, 404 n.11 (1990); Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy
Death: From Ancient Greece to Beyond Cruzan Toward a Reasoned Legal Response
to the Societal Dilemma of Euthanasia, 71 Deny. U. L. Rev. 175, 249 n.551 (1993)

(citing Hand, supra note 1); Miller, supra note 40, at E5; The Work of Justice, supra
note 38, at 17 (quoting Judge Wyzanski); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Book Review, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 283, 285 (1976). See also Harbaugh, supra note 39, at 264 ("apply the
rules of the game"); Bellacosa, supra note 26, at 1 (same); Justice Holmes Ex

Cathedra, supra note 17, at 213 ("administer the law") (emphasis in original); Arthur
Hill, Address at Memorial Service for Oliver Wendell Holmes at a Special Session of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 298 Mass. 575, 600 (1937) (same).
91See also Harbaugh, supra note 39, at 264 ("apply the rules of the game").
92

Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. at 401-02 (emphasis added). Burger at least is
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judges are a cog (an important cog, but only a cog) in a wheel
of the justice machine; for the machine to function, however,
judges must do their appropriate part, which is merely law
application.
A variation on Bork's variation appears in Professor Michael
Gerhardt's quite scathing review of Bork's book. 93 Gerhardt
writes: "In the book, Bork relates an anecdote in which Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes admonished Judge Learned Hand that
Holmes's job was not to do justice but rather to interpret the
law. ' 94 The change from "apply" to "interpret" is significant;
interpretation implies a more broad-ranging and creative task
than application. Three explanations for Gerhardt's misquote

come to mind. One arises from the vocabulary of constitutional
theory. Those in the Bork camp, favoring "judicial restraint,"
are "interpretivists." The second is that Gerhardt, consciously
or not, wants to use the story himself, which he is retelling only
incidentally. By making the choice between doing justice and
interpreting the law, rather than between doing justice and
applying the law, he shifts the whole debate a step toward a
more active judicial role. Even the narrow position does not
involve mechanical law-application, but the more creative and

active task of interpretation. 95 Third, Gerhardt may just be using
a more meaningful and accurate vocabulary. As suggested by
the very fact that the Borkian position is "interpretivism," not

honest about paraphrasing.
93Gerhardt, supra note 62.
94 Id. at 1392 (emphasis added).
95The exact difference between applying the law and interpreting the law would be
hard to define precisely. However, the former is a narrower, more constrained task
than the latter. See, e.g., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary
Proceedings, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1754, 1761 (1993) (mock opinion of Naomi R.
Cahn) (noting that under an ethic of justice(!), as opposed to an ethic of care,
"statutory interpretation becomes more of an exercise in statutory application")
(emphases in original). Indeed, there is a corner of bankruptcy law that turns on
exactly this distinction. Bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction is limited to issues arising
under the Bankruptcy Act. Yet bankruptcy proceedings inescapably will involve some
issues under other statutes as well. At some point those latter issues are sufficiently
pronounced as to deprive the bankruptcy court ofjurisdiction. The Second Circuit has
held that withdrawal of the case from the bankruptcy court is mandatory if the
bankruptcy judge must "engage in significant interpretation,as opposed to simple
application, of federal laws apart from the bankruptcy statutes." City of New York
v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphases added).
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"applicationism," the notion that judging is simply law application cannot stand, at least in the constitutional arena. 96
With surprising frequency, then, those telling the story
paraphrase Holmes' comment. As lawyers and law professors
know well, the paraphrase almost always changes meaning. To
play the game according to the rules is not the same as to apply
the law, which is not the same as to interpret the law, which is
not the same as to enforce the law, which is not the same as to
see that others play the game according to the rules, which is not
the same as to apply the rules of the game, and so on. In some
cases, these are surely careless paraphrases that might matter but
in context are irrelevant or at least innocent. In many others,
however, the change is made so that the story works better for
the story-teller's own purposes. The changes may be unconscious, but they are not insignificant.
IV. CONCLUSION

David Luban recently observed that Holmes' view of the
judicial role may well be narrower than what most Americans
actually want.97 Despite the common lament that judges too
often "legislate from the bench" instead of "interpreting the
law," it is not at all clear that many people actually wish judges
to adhere to Holmes' own description of his job: playing by the
rules and helping the citizenry to Hell if it wants to go. The
appeal of rule-based formalism tends to give way before that of
96 As Ronald Dworkin has recently pointed out, Hand himself acknowledged as
much:
[A]II the notable attempts by constitutional scholars and judges to explain how
[courts might exercise judicial review without second-guessing legislatures'
judgment about fundamental moral principles]-from Herbert Wechsler's plea
that judges develop "neutral" principles that nevertheless impose serious
constraints on legislation to Robert Bork's attempt to show that Brown was
right while all other liberal decisions of the last few decades were wrong-fail
for a reason Hand saw clearly and most of his critics ignore. The great
constitutional clauses set out extremely abstract moral principles that must be
interpreted before they can be applied, and any interpretation will commit the
interpreter to answers to fundamental questions of political morality and
philosophy.
Dworkin, supra note 60, at 21 (emphases added).
97 David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 Duke
L.J. 449, 510-11 (1994).
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preferred substantive results. This is one lesson of the rejection
of Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court; one way of
describing the nomination's failure is that it resulted from Bork's
endorsement of Holmes' description of his job.
Bork's stance can be contrasted with that of Justice Breyer,
who dealt with the Hand/Holmes story directly. During Justice
Breyer's confirmation hearings, Senator Cohen (R-Me.) told the
"do justice" story, observing that Breyer had not in any of his
statements promised to "do justice" and asking the nominee if
that was because he agreed with Holmes. 98 Cohen's interpretation, predictably, was that Holmes had meant that courts should
stay out of the legislature's way. Breyer acknowledged that that
was part of what Holmes meant (never contradict a Senator
during a confirmation hearing), but said that Holmes had
something else in mind as well. Holmes saw "ultimately the vast
object of this vast interrelated set of rules including rules that
say whose job is what as working out for society in a way that
is better for people rather than worse." 99 Breyer then launched
into a set piece about his longstanding conviction that a judge
needs both a heart and a head.
If you do not have a heart, it becomes a sterile set of rules,
removed from human problems, and it will not help. If you do
not have a head there is the risk that in trying to decide a
particular person's problem in a case that may look fine for that
person, you cause trouble for a lot of other people, making their
lives yet worse. 100
It is extremely difficult to find any of this in "My job is to play
the game according to the rules." As discussed above, one can
read Holmes (and Hand) as arguing that justice is only possible
through the rule of law, and so individual happiness will be
enhanced if the judiciary abjures a roving commission to do
good and yields to majoritarian preferences. Yet recall Holmes'
other best-known description of his "job": "[I]f my fellow
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."1O1
98 Breyer Hearings, supra note 24, at 230-31.
99 Id. at 231.
100 Id.

101 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1
Holmes-Laski Letters, supra note 10, at 249.
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Helping the citizenry on its way to Hell because of a foolish law
hardly seems the same as ensuring that things "work[] out for
society, in a way that's better for people rather than worse."
And Breyer's vision of the judge as social worker, dedicating

himself to solving individuals' problems, has no recognizable
10
basis in Holmes' reply to Hand or his thinking in general.

Through this strained interpretation, Justice Breyer manipulated the "Do justice!" story to make it seem to support his own
substantive position and so serve his own political needs. The
various retellings we have reviewed similarly turn the story to
the teller's advantage, but through direct revision rather than
interpretation. The goal is to make the Holmes position appear
either beneficent or unpalatable. This is done in two ways. One
is to fiddle with the quotation itself. Subtle differences in
wording matter; a good deal of the lawyer's or law professor's
time is spent trying to understand such differences. We always
want a good quote, even if we have to make it up ourselves.
The second sort of revision is to the narrative details and the
description of the events of the story itself.
What lessons can we draw from this exercise? I think there
are a few.
102 Justice Breyer's (mis)characterization of Holmes is a testament primarily to just
how overwhelming is the pressure to put on a meaningless show during the
confirmation process. Playing against type, he seized every opportunity to return to
his newly discovered theme: law is to work for the people. The both-a-head-and-aheart business is a particularly striking example of this confirmation conversion.
Breyer portrays the judge as someone whose basic task is to help people with their
problems. He needs both body parts not, as one might have thought, because
empathy and reason are both important to judging. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law", 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3, 9-12 (1988)
(arguing that law requires a dialogue between heart and head). Rather, he needs
heart and head so that he can be empathetic both to the people before him, to whom
his heart goes out, and to those who are not before him, to whom his head goes out.
Bork also offered an observation about head and heart during his hearings, and the
contrast is strong. Addressing the shift in his own political views, Bork quoted
Winston Churchill: "Any man who's not a socialist before he's 40 has no heart, and
any man who is a socialist after he's 40 has no head." Nomination of Robert H. Bork
to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 437 (1987). Where Breyer
came down firmly on the side of heart and empathy, Bork's undoing was that he
instead came down on the side of head and reason. See also id. at 854 (stating that
he wanted to be on the Court because "it would be an intellectual feast just to be
there and to read the briefs and discuss things with counsel and discuss things with my
colleagues").
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First, with regard to lawyers and law professors: Time and
again, we see subtle adjustments to help make the story more
effective and appropriate for the teller's purpose. This tendency
is hardly limited to lawyers, and among lawyers it is hardly
limited to stories. Yet it does show (as if we needed a reminder) that one cannot trust lawyers and law professors to tell
anything straight. It is therefore a caution to writers, and
readers, to be alert to carelessness or bad faith. Small modifications often matter greatly.
Second, to some extent this exercise confirms a central theme
of law-and-literature scholars: that the distinction between reality
and its expression, between substance and form, is at least
elusive and perhaps nonexistent. 103 If my discussion has shown
nothing else, it has shown that in any given version of this story
form and substance collaborate and merge. Some law-andliterature scholars might go further and argue that in the
retelling of a story accuracy (substance) is no more important
than, and perhaps indistinguishable from, how well the story is
told (form).104 Under this view, law is nothing but a story, one
continually retold and thus remade.
Such an understanding raises the normative question whether
the freedoms taken with Hand's tale should be welcomed or
lamented. Thus far, the stance of this Essay has been implicitly
critical of those who have altered Hand's story to fit their needs.
Yet I do not wish to push that criticism too far. Whether the
sort of modifications described above are troubling depends on
the purposes for which a story is offered. 105 For example, if the
"story" consists of the particular facts of a case, the outcome of
103For an elaboration of these themes of law and literature studies, see Richard
Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature 3-47 (1992).
104See id. at 6-10.
105 For example, Professor Chayes, it seems, would be unmoved by the objection that
he has told the story "wrong." In citing The Spirit of Liberty "for Judge Hand's
version of the story," see supra note 56, he is implicitly acknowledging his own inaccuracy and asserting that it is less important than having an effective story. Read for all
it is worth, Chayes' statement rests on an extreme historical relativism in which all
accounts of past events are equally valid. I would not go so far. Nonetheless, we

should not assume that "Judge Hand's version of the story" is itself precisely accurate.
Hand too puts a spin on the story. In addition, he has selectively recounted this story
from among all the possible stories about Holmes, or about law. This is not
qualitatively different than what those who retell the story have done.
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which turns on what version is accepted, then accuracy is of
course critical and worth striving for even if unattainable. On
the other hand, if the original "story" is the opinion in a prior,
similar case, now elaborated, reinterpreted, and "retold" by later
judges, what here seems careless or duplicitous might be
celebrated as the genius of the common law.106
This line of thought leads to an alternative jurisprudential
lesson, somewhat at odds with the more obvious conclusion
offered above about the need for precision, care, and good faith.
To play the game according to the rules requires knowing what
the rules are. Positivism in general presupposes that the law is
knowable, external, and reasonably static. The variety in the
retellings of this story hints that law can be none of those things.
If these were not retellings of an old story, but rather lawyers'
statements of the holding of a case, they would certainly pass the
Rule 11 threshold. Yet how different they are. If we cannot
even get a simple story right, how can we ever know the law and
play the game according to the rules?
Third, with regard to Holmes: In 1971, G. Edward White
wrote an article tracing Holmes' "rise and fall."1 07 White shows
how in each of six historical periods, both the strength and the
nature of Holmes' varying reputation reflected the nature of the
times themselves. 108 In the two-and-a-half decades since White's
article, Holmes' reputation has continued to change. The
examples of how the "Do justice!" story is used reveal something of how we might update White's article-how Holmes'
current complex reputation is consistent with the tenor of our
times.
Interest in Holmes has never been greater. The last few years
have seen a spate of new biographies;10 9 the University of
See Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 8-10 (1940).
107G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 51
106

(1971).
108Specifically, White offers the following divisions: 1881-1902, Holmes as Scientist;
1903-31, Holmes as Progressive; 1932-40, Holmes as Myth (this period marking the
height of the rise and the beginning of the fall); 1941-49, Demythologizing; 1950-59,
Sense of Alienation; and 1960-71, Holmes and Libertarianism-Egalitarianism (a period
in which Holmes' reputation reaches its nadir as he was dismissed as inhumane and
too comfortable with basic inequities). Id. at 54-74.
109See Aichele, supra note 25; Baker, supra note 32; Novick, supra note 32; White,
supra note 71.
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Chicago is publishing, for the first time, a set of collected
works;n 0 Judge Posner has edited a collection with the punning
title The Essential Holmes;"' the flow of law review articles has
become a flood. We even have a new play 12 to add to "The
Magnificent Yankee.""13 All this despite the fact that we
"know" Holmes was deeply flawed, both as a person and as a
judge. The result is an ambivalent and somewhat paradoxical
stance toward Holmes. Many individuals hold him in both awe
and contempt;" 4 that ambivalence is even more prominent in his
overall reputation. White was able to identify dominant, shared
views of Holmes during times past. Identifying such a shared
view would be much harder, if not impossible, to do today. To
be sure, discerning single, dominant attitudes is always an easier
task when describing the past than the present, but I also think
this may be a particular sign of the times. Consider the Holmes
we see just in the different versions of the "Do justice!" story:
wrongheaded, wise, nasty, friendly, authoritarian, deferential,
humorless, puckish, narrow, precise, disagreeable, appealing. It
is perhaps appropriate to this scattered, diffuse, fractured age,
and symptomatic of the overall lack of consensus in the legal
academy in particular, that so many Holmeses are present

simultaneously.
Finally, with regard to stories: Without entering into the
firestorm over narrative scholarship, I would note that the pervasiveness of Hand's story, used by writers of every political stripe,
should remind us that stories have always been, and should
always be, part of argument, discussion, and exploration. No
110

The Collected Works of Justice Holmes: Complete Public Writings and Selected
Judicial Opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). As of
this writing, three of an anticipated five volumes have appeared.
111 The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions,
and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
112Rodney A. Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36 Wm.& Mary L. Rev.
173 (1994). Smolla's work might be said to be primarily about whether a judge should
do justice or play by the rules. The dialogue closest to the Hand-Holmes exchange

is set out in the Appendix, infra.
113 In

fact, this half-century-old chestnut has also recently been dusted off. See

Pamela Sommers, Justice Holmes For All, Feb. 9, 1996, at F2 (reviewing current
production of the Emmet Lavery play).
114For an

insightful discussion of the ambivalence felt by one person, namely, Grant

Gilmore, see Charles Yablon, Grant Gilmore, Holmes, and the Anxiety of Influence,
90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 236 (1995).
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doubt there are stories and there are stories. One can endorse
the occasional illustrative anecdote within traditional scholarship
without accepting autobiographical or fictional narratives as
stand-alone articles; there is a difference between using narrative
to assist traditional scholarship and using it to replace such
scholarship. Nonetheless, the power and value of a good story
are inescapable. To return to the three versions of this story
with which I began, neither Hand, nor Bork, nor Chayes had to
include this story to make his point. Yet each thought that the
point would be clearer and fuller if illuminated by the story.
I believe each was right. Indeed, the apparently irresistible
impulse to modify the story is an implicit acknowledgement that
the narrative itself, with all its attendant, apparently incidental,
details, is important, rhetorically and substantively. By the same
token, the unconscious ease with which those using Hand's story
modify it reminds and warns us of how ready we are to find in
a quotation or a story what we are looking for, like the careless
scientist who adjusts the facts to fit the hypothesis. And the
effectiveness of the changes reminds and warns us of how
powerful a story can be.
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APPENDIX

[Holmes] was to me the master craftsman certainly of our time;
and he said: "I hate justice," which he didn't quite mean. What
he did mean was this. I remember once I was with him; it was
a Saturday when the Court was to confer. It was before we had
a motor car, and we jogged along in an old coup6. When we
got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as
he walked off, I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!"
He turned quite sharply and he said: "Come here. Come here."
I answered: "Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not my
job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."
Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in The Spirit of Liberty
302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960). This speech, or the
relevant portion thereof, is set out verbatim in Eva H. Hanks,
Michael E. Herz & Steven S. Nemerson, Elements of Law 38
(1994); The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations
185-86 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 1993); Peter Hay, The Book of
Legal Anecdotes 226 (1989); Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial
Process 263-64 (2d ed. 1996); Harry C. Shriver, What Gusto:
Stories and Anecdotes About Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 10
(1970); Justice Holmes Ex Cathedra 229 (Edward J. Bander ed.,
1966); Martin Mayer, The Lawyers 520 (1966) (citing Curtis);
Charles P. Curtis, Law as Large as Life: A Natural Law for
Today and the Supreme Court as its Prophet 156-57 (1959).
It is quoted accurately, though only partially, in Donald Dale
Jackson, Judges 331-32 (1974) (citing Mayer); Michael S. Ariens,
Dutiful Justice, 22 St. Mary's L. Rev. 1019, 1023 & n.30 (1991)
(citing Bander); and John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and
Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237, 241 n.15 (1987)
(citing Hand, A Personal Confession).
We were going downtown from "I" Street in a cab before he
had a motor. We had a pleasant, as I remember it, chat about
that decision of McKinna on the steel trust, which as you may
remember was not the highest flight of judicial analysis. I made
what I thought was a guarded statement to the effect that I was
not sure that I understood it, to which the answer was "I didn't
care a damn what he said, as long as he came out right."
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But that is not what I want to give you of that day's talk. We
came to the Capitol and got out: he was going to the usual 12
o'clock conference. I can see his figure retreating from me as
I stood by the cab which was going to take me back uptown.
He was bent but still vigorous, and by way of a parting shot that
I knew would bring him round, I said: "Well, Sir, goodbye, do
justice." He did turn around quite quickly for so old a man and
beckoned to me, saying "Come here young fellar, come here."
I came up to him saying, "I know, Sir, I know." When I got to
him he said: "That is not my business. I am here to play the
game according to the rules."
Letter from Learned Hand to Mark DeWolfe Howe (Apr. 29,
1959) (attachment 2) (on file at Harvard Law School under
Hand Papers, Box 90, File 31).
I had gone down with him from his house to the court house,-then in the Capitol,--and the cab, for it was not a motor, was
to take me back to the center of the city. I got out of the cab
first and then he got out and as he was walking his way to the
Capitol I said to him by way of jest: "Well, Sir, do justice." He
turned around quickly, and beckoned me to come to him, which
I did. He said: "Young fellar, that is not my job. My job is to
play the game according to the rules."
Letter from Learned Hand to Ray Henson (Jan. 11, 1960),
quoted in Ray D. Henson, The Law of Sales ix (1985) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review).
When late in his career, a friend parted with Holmes on the
steps of the Supreme Court, saying, "Well, Sir, Good Bye-Do
justice!" Holmes replied, "that's not my job! My job is to play
the game according to the rules."
Gary J. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Soldier, Scholar,
Judge 140 (1989) (citing Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, Justice
Touched with Fire, in Mr. Justice Holmes 183, 206 (Felix
Frankfurter ed., 1931) and Francis Biddle, Justice Holmes,
Natural Law, and the Supreme Court 71 (1961)).
It is said that as Justice Holmes was leaving the banquet hall
after the farewell dinner tendered him by the Boston Bar,
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before he left for Washington to take his seat on the Bench of
the Supreme Court of the United States, someone called out:
"Now justice will be administered in Washington."
To this the new justice is reported to have replied:
"Don't be too sure. I am going there to administer the law."
Justice Holmes Ex Cathedra 213 (Edward J. Bander ed., 1966)
(citing Butler, A Century at the Bar of the Supreme Court of
the United States 50-51 (1942)). See also Peter Hay, The Book
of Legal Anecdotes 226 (1989) (telling the same story, but
assigning a date of December 1902, identifying the host as the
Middlesex Bar Association, and quoting Holmes as saying that
he was going "to administer the laws").
An anecdotal conversation between two judicial icons
tempers this notion [Aristotle's "idealized version" of justice]
with some modem realism. Judge Learned Hand is supposed
to have bade a gingerly "Do justice" farewell to Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes on the steps of the imposing Tribunal on
whose upper pediment appears the frieze message: Equal
Justice Under Law. The Justice, it is said, exclaimed, "Justice?
All we do here is apply the rules of the game!"
Joseph W. Bellacosa, Foreword, 1992 Annual Survey of New
York Law, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 1 (1993) (citing William H.
Harbaugh, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis 264
(1973)).
Now and then he [Charles P. Curtis, in Law as Large as Life]
recounts talk worth remembering, particularly a talk that Hand
had with Holmes. They jogged down to the Capitol togetherit was before the justice had a car, and he was bound for the
Court. To tease him into a response, as they parted, Hand said:
"Well, sir, goodbye. Do Justice!" The other turned sharply:
"That is not my job. My job is to play the game according to
the rules."
Francis Biddle, Justice Holmes, Natural Law, and the Supreme
Court 71 (1961) (citing Curtis).
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There is a story that two of the greatest figures in our law,
Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, had lunch together
and afterward, as Holmes began to drive off in his carriage,
Hand, in a sudden onset of enthusiasm, ran after him, crying,
"Do justice, sir, do justice." Holmes stopped the carriage and
reproved Hand: "That is not my job. It is my job to apply the
law." I meant something like that when I dissented from a
decision that seemed to proceed from sympathy rather than law:
"[W]e administer justice according to law. Justice in a larger
sense, justice according to morality, is for Congress and the
President to administer, if they see fit, through the creation of
new law."
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 6 (1990) (quoting
Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304,313 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc), rev'd, 482 U.S. 64
(1987)) (footnotes omitted) (citing Sergeant and Shriver). This
paragraph is quoted approvingly in Karl N. Gellert, Note, In re
Comprehensive Review Technology: Improper Analysis of
Future Advances and the Priority of Security Interests Under
Article 9, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1641, 1650 n.37 (1993). Bork's
account is copied verbatim, cites and all, though without
attribution, in In re Funding Systems Asset Management Corp.,
111 B.R. 500, 502 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
If useful at all, the labels ["activist" and "neutralist" or "passivist"] may be more serviceable to distinguish the judge who sees
his role as guided by the principle that "justice or righteousness
is the source, the substance and the ultimate end of the law,"
from the judge for whom the guiding principle is that "courts do
not sit to administer justice, but to administer the law." Such
legendary names as Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand
have been associated with the latter view.
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Memoriam: J. Skelly Wright, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 361, 361 (1988) (no citation).
The temptation to exceed our limited judicial role and do what
we regard as the more sensible thing is great, but it takes us on
a slippery slope. Our duty, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes
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in a conversation with Judge Learned Hand, is not to do justice
but to apply the law and hope that justice is done.
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 401-02 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (citing Hand, A Personal Confession).
Let me conclude with an old story about judges, law and
justice. [Fn: For Judge Hand's version of the story, see L.
Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 306-07 (I. Dilliard 3d ed. 1960).]
Learned Hand was visiting Washington and went to lunch with
Justice Holmes. They walked back to the Capitol. The Court
was still sitting there in the Old Senate Chamber. As they
parted, Hand called, "Sir, do justice."
The old man turned on him fiercely, eyebrows bristling:
"Justice? What's that? That's none of my business. Law is my
business." What else would we expect of the Holmes who
many years earlier in The Path of the Law invented the "bad
man theory of the law." His point then was the same: law and
justice inhabit different realms.
We know that is not true. We know that law is inevitably
concerned with justice.
Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 1041 & n.78 (1988) (footnote omitted).
Senator COHEN: I was looking through [Hand's] book, "The
Spirit of Liberty," and he was talking about his relationship with
Holmes, whom you are also a great devotee of, in terms of his
writings and decisions. And Holmes used to frequently say, "I
hate justice." Of course, Hand would go on to say he really did
not mean that, but he tried to make the point that on one
occasion when they were driving in an automobile past the
Supreme Court, when Holmes was going to a weekly conference, Hand tried to pique him a little bit, and he said, "Well,
sir, goodbye. Do justice."
Holmes turned around and snapped at him and said, "That
is not my job. My job is to play the game according to the
rules."
... At no time did you say that you intended to do justice.

I take it that your reluctance to do that was the same for
Holmes as well, of not seeking to do justice in the sense of
intervening into an area that was properly before that of the
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Congress or the State legislature. Is that how you would
interpret Holmes' statement... ?
Judge BREYER: In part, yes, but I think that Holmes means
more than that. I think Holmes-and it is another reason I do
admire him-I think that he sees the rules from the time he
wrote [The Common Law] up through his Supreme Court
career, I think he sees all this vast set of rules as interrelated.
And I suspect, although I am not positive, that he sees ultimately the vast object of this vast interrelated set of rules including rules that say whose job is what as working out for
society in a way that is better for people rather than worse.
I suppose when you say "Do justice," or you say, "No, no; I
am just following the rules," what you worry about is someone
trying to decide an individual case without thinking out the
effect of that decision on a lot of other cases. That is why I
always think law requires both a heart and a head. If you do
not have a heart, it becomes a sterile set of rules, removed from
human problems, and it will not help. If you do not have a
head, there is the risk that in trying to decide a particular
person's problem in a case that may look fine for that person,
you cause trouble for a lot of other people, making their lives
yet worse.

Nomination of Judge Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.

230-31 (1994).
[For Holmes,] [f]aw is obedience to rules rather than a quest for
justice.... According to Learned Hand, Holmes denied that
as a judge he did justice, and admitted only to enforcing the
rules.
Stephen Diamond, Citizenship, Civilization, and Coercion:
Justice Holmes on the Tax Power, in The Legacy of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. 115, 146,283 n.115 (Robert W. Gordon ed.,
1992) (citing Hand, A Personal Confession).
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[Robert Bork] concur[s] with Justice Holmes that judges should
not "do justice" because their job is "to apply the law."
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the
Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43
Duke L.J. 1, 55 n.22 (1993) (citing Bork).
As Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed,... f]udges empowered
to adjudicate according to their individual sense of justice might
produce a benevolent despotism, but such a regime would put
an end to the reign of law. Justice Holmes echoed those
sentiments in admonishing Judge Learned.Hand that the judicial
duty is not to invoke a personal standard of justice but to play
the game according to the rules.
Bruce Fein, On Reading the Constitution, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1225,
1228 (1992) (book review) (footnote omitted) (citing Hand, A
Personal Confession).
[Holmes] can appear to be everything from romanticist, idealist,
and mystic to positivist, realist, Darwinist, skeptic, and cynic.
The master craftsman and inspiring philosopher can also be the
narrowest and most unattractive of tacticians. "I hate justice,"
he tells Learned Hand, "... That is not my job. My job is to
play the game according to the rules." But the job and the
rules are not so clear in many of Holmes' decisions. As the
Abrams dissent demonstrates, the patrician is not above ridiculing the people whose rights he must protect.
Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Political Culture: Holmes and the
Judicial Figure, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 506, 544 (1988) (footnote
omitted) (citing Shriver).
In The Tempting ofAmerica, Robert Bork recounts a story in
which Judge Learned Hand reportedly pleaded with Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Do justice, sir, do justice," to which
Holmes responded, "'That is not my job. It is my job to apply
the law."'
Michael J. Gerhardt & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Constitutional
Theory: Arguments and Perspectives 161 (1993) (citing Bork).
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Bork lowers, rather than elevates, constitutional dialogue
because he wants to end the dialectical process of constitutional
interpretation. Bork's intolerance for, and inability to participate in, an open dialogue on the meaning of the Constitution is
well illustrated through Bork's use of another story. In the
book, Bork relates an anecdote in which Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes admonished Judge Learned Hand that Holmes's job
was not to do justice but rather to interpret the law. Early in
the book, Bork praises Holmes for this admonition ....
Michael Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1358,
1392 (1989) (reviewing Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America (1990)) (citing Bork).
[W]hen I hear our new Supreme Court nominee Stephen
Breyer's deeply ambiguous promise to make the law "work for
the people," I'm uneasy. Justice Holmes, a towering figure in
our judicial history, didn't promise to make the law "work for
the people." Holmes soberly and somberly declared that his job
was simply to "apply the law." A daunting enough job in itself,
one would think.
Richard Grenier, Two cheers, No More, for the Court in Brown,
Wash. Times, May 25, 1994, at A17 (no citation, but referring to
Bork elsewhere in the column).
Once, in the 1920's, Hand closed a talk with Holmes by saying,
with mischievous intent, "Goodbye Mr. Justice, now go and do
justice!" Holmes, who was leaving, turned around and said,
"What's that you said?" Hand repeated the remark. Holmes
retorted: "You know better than to say a thing like that. All we
do is apply the rules of the game."
William H. Harbaugh, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W.
Davis 264 (1973). Harbaugh gives as his source a memo to him
from Ralph M. Carson, one of Davis's law partners. He uses the
story to illustrate the judicial equivalent to Davis's understanding of the lawyer as a free moral agent. The use and
genesis of the quote make one think that Davis himself used to
tell the story. Harbaugh's account is reprinted in Quote It II: A
Dictionary of Memorable Legal Quotations 207 (Eugene C.
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Gerhart ed., 1988) and in Michael A. Hammer, Comment, The
Constitutional, Judicial and Social Pitfalls Attendant to the
Criminalization of Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse: A Plea
for Governmental Uniformity and Mercy, 22 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1456, 1500 n.214 (1992) (using brackets to identify the interlocutors as "[Justice] Hand" and "[Justice] Holmes").
[A] very long time ago [Hand] and Justice Holmes had taken a
horse-drawn cab from the Justice's house to the Capitol, where
the Court then sat. Judge Hand got out of the cab first and
then Justice Holmes got out and started to walk to the Capitol,
at which point Judge Hand "said to him by way of jest: 'Well,
Sir, do justice.' He turned around quickly, and beckoned me to
come to him, which I did. He said, 'Young feller, that is not my
job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."'
Ray D. Henson, The Law of Sales ix (1985) (quoting January 11,
1960 letter from Hand to the author). The letter is set out more
fully above.
[Holmes'] mind... was characteristic of the Puritan stock from
which he came. There was nothing vague about his law. It had
the hard clear-cut outline of the traditional Puritan doctrine....

Characteristic was his answer to a friend, who, on meeting him
on his way to the court house, said: "So, you are about to do
justice." To meet the reply, "No, I am going to administer the
law."
Arthur Hill, Address at Memorial Service for Oliver Wendell
Holmes at a Special Session of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, 298 Mass. 575, 599-600 (1937) (no citation).
Viewing judges as policymakers may be problematic because
such a view is contrary to some definitions of judging.... See
generally, E. Sergeant, Justice Touched With Fire... (Holmes
states his job is only to apply the law).
Katharine L. Huth, Note, Garcia Revisited: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Application to Appointed State Court
Judges, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 403, 404 n.11 (1990) (citing Sergeant).
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...

"do justice" philosophy

[namely, a decision under the Truth in Lending Act that was
best explained by the court's anger toward greedy creditors]
brings to mind a story about Mr. Justice Holmes. It is reported
that Learned Hand met Justice Holmes walking to the Supreme
Court and urged him to "Do justice!" "That is not my job,"
Holmes replied. "My job is to play the game according to the
rules."
Colin K. Kaufman, Comment, Bringing Chaos Out of Order:
Truth in Lending in the Courts, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 937, 943 (1976)
(citing Shriver).
One Saturday, old friends, Judge Learned Hand and Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, shared a ride in a coupe. At their
destination, Holmes stepped down and walked away. Hand
decided to goad his older friend. Hand called out, "Well, sir,
good-bye. Do justice!" Holmes stopped, turned, and summoned Hand nearer. Hand drew close. "That is not my job,"
Holmes admonished. "My job is to play the game according to
the rules." In the area of benign racial classifications (affirmative action), the Supreme Court has ...

been more concerned

with achieving some amorphous concept of justice than playing
by the constitutional and statutory rules.
James L. McAlister, Comment, A Pigment of the Imagination:
Looking at Affirmative Action Through Justice Scalia's ColorBlind Rule, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 327, 327 (1994) (footnote omitted)
(citing Shriver).
[Addressing a trial advocacy course at St. Mary's Law School,
then-Justice William Rehnquist] recounted a conversation
between Learned Hand and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., while
Holmes was on the Supreme Court, which exemplifies Rehnquist's idea of what constitutes justice. When told by Judge
Hand to "do justice," Holmes replied, "That is not my job. My
job is to play the game according to the rules."
Michael T. Larkin, Casenote, 21 St. Mary's L.J. 1063, 1077 n.70
(1990) (citations omitted).
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Parting from Justice Holmes, Judge Learned Hand enjoined,
"Do justice." Justice Holmes responded, "That is not my job.
My job is to play the game according to the rules."
Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D.
369, 370 n.2 (1987) (citing Aldisert).
Some months ago, in a prior Opinion, we spoke of a meeting
between Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Learned
Hand. At the conclusion thereof Hand pursued Justice Holmes'
horse drawn buggy and cried out to Holmes to "Do justice, Sir,
do justice!". In admonishing Hand, Justice Holmes advised that
it was not his duty or prerogative to do justice. His duty was to
apply the law.
Were we granted authority to "Do justice, Sir", then clearly
this contract would be temporarily modified [to allow the debtor
to reorganize].... Unfortunately, we are not granted carte
blanche to "do good and avoid evil."
In re George Cindrich General Contracting, Inc., 130 B.R. 20,
21-22 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (Markovitz, J.) (referring to, but
not citing, In re Funding Systems Asset Management Corp., 111
B.R. 500, 500 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), which in turn copies, but
does not cite, Bork's version).
No one would argue that the system [of appellate review] is a
system of perfect justice. In the words of Justice Holmes, the
best that appellate judges can do is ensure that the game is
played by the rules.
Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The
General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1023, 1038
(1987) (citing Hand, A Personal Confession).
An old story has it that when Holmes departed to assume his
duties on the Supreme Court he was admonished to do Justice.
He responded thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce
the law.
Wallace Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in
the Court 116 (2d ed. 1966) (no citation). See also Raoul
Berger, Government By Judiciary 289 n.24 (1977) ("It is said
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that when Holmes left the Massachusetts Court for the Supreme
Court, 'he was admonished to do justice. He responded
thoughtfully that his job was merely to enforce the law."')
(quoting Mendelson).
I recall a conversation with [Justice Black] in the 1950s, at the
end of which I asked what he perceived his job to be as a
member of the Supreme Court. Without hesitation, he drew
himself up and replied: "To do justice." And that he did, as he
saw justice. (His response differs from one attributed to Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who once was enjoined by Judge
Learned Hand "to do justice"; Holmes, then in his 80s, thundered back to Hand (in his 60s): "Sonny, that's not my job. My
job is to apply the law.")
Arthur S. Miller, A Justice Who Did Justice, Wash. Post, May
22, 1977, at E5 (book review) (no citation).
There's an old story in American law that David Savage's
book [Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme
Court (1992)] brings to mind. On a Saturday afternoon many
years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. took a break from
his work at the Supreme Court and went for lunch with his
friend Judge Learned Hand, a man 30 years younger than
Holmes who was just beginning a celebrated judicial career of
his own. As the two men returned to the Old Senate Chamber
in the Capitol Building, where the Supreme Court once sat, they
took their leave, and Hand called out to Holmes, "Sir, do
justice." The old man wheeled around, glared at his protege,
and fired back, "That is not my job. My job, sir, is to play the
game according to the rules."
Terence Moran, The Emperors Have No Robes, Wash. Monthly,
May 1992, at 41 (book review) (no citation).
[While working as a special agent for the IRS,] I was frequently reminded of a conversation reported to have occurred
between Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis. "Go and do justice," Brandeis said. "No, Louie," Holmes
replied, "that is not our job. We are here to enforce the laws,
not to do justice."
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Emil Poggi, Unjust Tax Laws Corrupt Our Society, Letter to the
Editor, N.Y. Times, Sep. 25, 1988, § 4, at 24 (no citation).
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once was bidding goodbye to
Judge Learned Hand of the New York Court of Appeals. "Do
justice!" Judge Hand said. Justice Holmes replied: "That is not
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."

Jack Harrison Pollack, Mr. Justice, Mr. Politics, N.Y. Times, Sep.
7, 1982, at A23.
[Justice should play a larger part in legal practice and judging
than it currently does, and one element of justice is aesthetic: a
just decision or statute is beautiful.] There is a school of jurisprudence, however, that would reject not merely beauty, but
justice itself, as a criterion of decisionnaking and lawmaking.
Members of this school, known as "positivists," would find both
concepts repellently subjective. So great a man as Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes said, perhaps in jesting response to
Judge Learned Hand's admonition to "do Justice": "Young
feller, that is not my job. My job is to play the game according
to the rules."
Louis B. Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 141, 147-48 (1987) (citing Henson).
A judge of the Federal bench tells of driving with Justice
Holmes to the Capitol one morning some years ago, in that neat
brougham drawn by a fat cob, with a highly respectable
coloured coachman on the box, in which Holmes used to be
recognized on the Washington streets. The Justice had got out
of the carriage and was striding off, vigorous and loose-limbed,
toward the dome when the younger man called out humorously:
"Do justice, sir!" Holmes wheeled: "Come here, young feller!"
and then, "I am not here to do justice. I am here to play the
game according to the rules. When I was at the bar and Lowell
used to beat, I'd say to him: 'Judge, your result may be good,
but it's another game I undertook to play. I gave you a thrust
in tierce and you countered with a bag of potatoes over my
head."'
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Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, Justice Touched With Fire, in Mr.
Justice Holmes 183, 206-07 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1931).
Sergeant's essay first appeared as Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
New Republic, Dec. 8, 1926, at 59. Her account is quoted
accurately in Grover Joseph Rees 1I1, Albert Tate on the
Judicial Function, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 721, 727 n.31 (1987); Grover
Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 913,
930 n.54 (1983).
SOCRATES: Do you agree that during [your] tenure [on the
Supreme Court], it was your duty to dispense justice?
HOLMES: No. I wouldn't put it that way. It was my duty to
interpret and apply the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.
SOCRATES: But you bore the title of "Justice." And you sat
on your nation's highest court of justice. And the constitution
and laws of a nation exist to allot justice, do they not?
HOLMES: You are playing your usual icy games with words,
Socrates. You call the Supreme Court the highest court of
justice. I might just as easily call it the highest court of law.
Rodney A. Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173, 207-08 (1994).
Any Justice of the Supreme Court who decides cases on the
basis of where he personally stands on issues lacks the integrity
for the job.
... Holmes was quite clear about the role of a Supreme
Court Justice. His job was "to see that the game is played
according to the rules," he said, "whether I like them or not."
It has taken centuries of struggle by giants to establish the
ideal of "a government of laws and not of men." Today,
pygmies are trying to reduce it all to a question of a judge's
"views."
Thomas Sowell, Integrity is the Issue, Forbes, Oct. 28, 1991, at
90 (no citation).
One day, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was leaving to go
to the Supreme Court, a friend said to him, "Well, off to do
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justice again!" Holmes is said to have replied, "Sonny, I don't
do justice; I just make sure that people play by the rules."
Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law 108 (1988) (no citation) (also referring to
"Holmes's quip").
A long line of respected twentieth-century judges has taken
the position that the proper decisionmaking calculus for an
appellate judge should not include unarticulated notions of
fairness and justice.
From Holmes's alleged rejoinder to
Learned Hand's exhortation to "do justice" ("that is not my
job") ....

G. Edward White, Earl Warren as Jurist, 67 Va. L. Rev. 461,540
(1981) (no citation).
[T]he American judicial tradition requires that the judge must
always decide according to law, and not permit his conscientious
scruples to override the law. Judge Learned Hand once
recounted an incident that occurred when he accompanied
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to work one morning.
Hoping to provoke Holmes, Hand said, "Do justice." With
apparent agitation, Holmes responded, "That is not my job. My
job is to play the game according to the rules."
William M. Wiecek, Liberty Under Law: The Supreme Court in
American Life 76 (1988) (no citation, but referring to Chief
Justice Burger's opinion in Bifulco v. United States in the next
sentence).
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes drove off after lunch with
Justice [sic] Learned Hand, the latter exclaimed, "Do justice, sir,
do justice." Holmes halted his carriage and reproved Hand:
"That is not my job. It is my job to apply the law." That story
involving two of America's finest legal minds is told by a third
such, Robert Bork, in his elegant and entertaining new book,
The Tempting of America. The story encapsulates the philosophic stance that brought down upon Bork unprecedented
furies. His book is a ringing defense of what his most fanatical
opponents feared: democracy.
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"Do Justice!"

George F. Will, The Tempting of America, Newsweek, Dec. 4,
1989, at 96 (citing Bork). This paragraph is quoted in full in
George Anastaplo, Bork on Bork, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1142, 1154
n.46 (1990) (reviewing Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America (1990)).
From the time at least of Plato, whose greatest dialogue bears
as an alternate title, "On Justice," there has been a plausible
proposal that justice should be more than a philosophical ideal,
or a balance among competing virtues, but ought to be the very
measure of the law.
Yet the proposal is not so clearly sound as to be self-evident.
Otherwise, O.W. Holmes would not have answered Learned
Hand's injunction to "Do justice, Sir," with the sharply caustic
reply, "Sonny, you don't understand my job. It is to apply the
law."
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Book Review, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 283,
285 (1976) (no citation).
About 1915, Mr. Justice Holmes invited a then young U.S.
district judge, Learned Hand, to accompany him as he rode
toward the Capitol to sit on the Supreme Court of the U.S. As
they approached their destination, the district judge left the
carriage and, waving farewell, called out, "Do justice, sir."
Sharply he was summoned back, "Sonny, you don't understand
my job; it is to apply the law."
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., quoted in The Work of Justice, Time,
May 5, 1958, at 15, 17 n.*, reprinted in 104 Cong. Rec. 8237, 8238
n.3 (1958).

